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Abstract: This paper reviews criticisms of the notice-and-
choice and harm-based frameworks for privacy policy, and
urges researchers and policymakers to focus on the concept
of privacy externalities. These externalities occur when
disclosure of personal information by some people reveals
information about others. Examples from eligibility
contexts, data mining, social networks, and social science
research illustrate the concept. When information leakage
of this kind harms others, then merely relying on individual
consent to determine the legitimacy of an information
collection and use practice will not be sufficient. To take into
account these externalities the paper develops an unfairnessframework. In this framework, choice is a means to an end,
not an end in itself. The purpose of the framework is to
prevent privacy harms. The framework divides information
collection and use practices into impermissible uses where
the harm is so great choice should not be permitted; public
benefit uses where the benefit is so great choice should not
be allowed; and intermediate uses where choice is
appropriate. The article recommends the use of the Federal
Trade Commission's unfairness standard as a way to assess
the privacy implications of information practices.
"[T]he solution to regulating information flow is not to radically
curtail the collection of information but to regulate uses."i
* Mark MacCarthy is adjunct professor in the Conununication, Culture and Technology
Program at Georgetown University, where he teaches and conducts research in technology
policy. Since February 2011, he has been Vice President of Public Policy for the Software
and Information Industry Association.
' DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 91-92 (New York University Press) (2004).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy policy is back. Policymakers and the public are again
concerned about the collection of personal information by businesses
and its possible misuse. The Federal Trade Commission has released a
report re-conceptualizing privacy policy.2 The Department of
Commerce issued its own privacy report,3 and it is co-chairing an
interagency working group on privacy.4 Legislation regulating online
privacy has been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives.s
The European Commission announced a re-examination of its Data
Protection Directive to see if parts of it need to be upgraded in light of
new economic and technological developments. 6 The International
Conference of Privacy and Data Protection Commissioners drafted a
new international privacy standard.7
But what is the best way to protect privacy? Many of the revived
concerns raised by privacy advocates and political leaders focus on the
lack of control by data subjects over the collection and use of their
2 Fed. Trade Comm'n, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, December
2010, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf, (last visited
March 14, 2011).
3 Dep't of Commerce, Notice of Inquiry, Information Privacy and Innovation in the
Internet Economy, 75 Fed. Reg. 21,226 (Apr. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Commerce Privacy
NOI], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-04-23/pdf/2010-9450.pdf.
4 SUBCOMM. ON PRIVACY & INTERNET POL'Y, COMM. ON TECH., NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL,
CHARTER, available at http://www.privacylives.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/11/102010-nstc-privacy-subcommittee-charter.pdf.
5 Rick Boucher, Press Release, U.S. Congressman, Boucher, Stearns Release Discussion
Draft of Privacy Legislation, May 3, 2010. The initial reaction was not favorable from
either privacy advocates or industry representatives. See Proposed Privacy Legislation
Wins Few Fans, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2010,
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/05/04/proposed-privacy-legislation-wins-few-
fans/tab/print.
6 EUROPEAN COMM'N, A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ON PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION, Nov. 4, 201o, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting-public/ooo6/com_2010_609_en.pdf
7 INT'L CONFERENCE OF DATA PROT. AND PRIVACY COMM'RS, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON
THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA AND PRIVACY, Nov. 5, 2009, available at
http://www.privacyconference2009.org/dpas space/space~reserved/documentosadopta
dos/common/2oo9_Madrid/estandares_resolucion madrid_en.pdf.
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personal information, and they propose policies to increase individual
control over the collection and use of information. 8
This Article argues that this informed consent model of privacy
regulation is deeply flawed. I rehearse some traditional criticisms of
this model and then draw attention to the difficulties that negative
privacy externalities create for the informed consent approach. The
second major contribution of this Article is to describe a more
promising alternative regulatory approach.9 The unfairness model of
privacy regulation described in this Article would allow policymakers
to evaluate directly the outcomes of information use without focusing
solely on creating an ideal information collection process.
In the United States, the "informed consent" modello has endured
because it is based on two compelling ideas: (i) that privacy has to do
with the ability of data subjects to control information about them,
and (2) that people have very different privacy preferences." In
principle, informed consent allows data subjects to control
information according to their own preferences.
8 In releasing his draft privacy legislation, Representative Boucher said, "Our legislation
confers privacy rights on individuals, informing them of the personal information that is
collected and shared about them and giving them greater control over the collection, use
and sharing of that information." See Boucher, Press Release, supra note 5.
9 Policymakers might be falling back on notice and consent for lack of an alternative. See
FTC, EXPLORING PRIVACY: A ROUNDTABLE SERIES (Dec. 7, 2009) (introductory remarks of
FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/o912o7privacyremarks.pdf ("We do feel that the
approaches we've tried so far-both the notice-and-choice regime, and later the harm-based
approach-haven't worked quite as well as we would like. But it could be that this issue is a
lot like Churchill's view of democracy: 'it has been said that democracy is the worst form of
government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."').
1o It is the basic structure for the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15
U.S.C.§§ 6501-o6 (2006), the FTC's privacy principles, see FTC, FAIR INFORMATION
PRACTICE PRINCIPLES, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm
(last visited March 14, 2011), and the financial privacy provisions in Title V of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§68o1-og (2oo6). I call it the informed consent model
rather than the notice-and-choice (or notice-and-consent) model because this label directly
states its enormous normative appeal. People can be said to express their approval of a
social practice if they fully understand it and willingly engage in it. A social practice seems
to be legitimate when individuals have so consented to it.
1l In their modern incarnafions, both ideas derive from Alan Westin. ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (Atheneum, 1968) (1967).
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Despite this intuitive appeal, the informed consent model has been
widely criticized.12 Internet privacy policies and the federally
mandated financial privacy notices are often cited as examples of the
failure of this approach. They are largely unread, not very informative,
and written too broadly. They would also be astonishingly costly to
read. In 2009, researchers at Carnegie Mellon estimated that the cost
to the economy of the time spent reading Internet privacy notices
would be $781 billion per year.13
As many have pointed out, the problems are more fundamental
than how to get notices read. Restrictions on disclosure are
impractical in a digital world where information collection is
ubiquitous, where apparently anonymous or de-identified information
can be associated with a specific person, and where data analytics on
large or linked databases can allow extraordinary and unpredictable
inferences.14 It is no longer reasonable to expect a typical Internet user
to understand what information is collected about him or her online,
what can be inferred from that information, and what can be done
with the profiles and analytics based on that information. In this
context, relying on informed consent to prevent information harms
would be similar to letting people decide for themselves what level of
exposure to toxic substances they would accept in the workshop or the
environment.
I add to these standard criticisms of the informed consent model
by focusing on negative privacy externalities, where one person's
decision to share information can adversely affect others who choose
12 See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER
PROT. IN THE AGE OF THE INFO. ECON. (Jane K. Winn ed., 2oo6); Daniel J. Weitzner, et al.,
Information Accountability, (Computer Sci. & Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Technical
Report MIT-CSAIL-TR-2007-o34, 2007), available at
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/376oo/MIT-CSAIL-TR-2007-034.pdf
l3Aleecia McDonald & Laurie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4I/S:
J.L & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 543, (2oo8) available at
http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/readingPolicyCost-authorDraft.pdf
14 The Department of Commerce summed up these criticisms as follows: "[T]he customary
notice-and-choice approach to consumer protection may be outdated, especially in the
context of information-intensive, Web-based services ... [O]nline interactions and web-
based information linkages have become so complicated that it is increasingly difficult to
provide consumers truly meaningful notice-and-choice." Commerce Privacy NOT at 21,229,
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-04-23/pdf/2010-9450.pdf; see also
James Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1,
66 (2003). (After surveying the difficulties in individual-level policing of privacy he
concluded: "More 'nofice and consent' requirements are not likely to provide greater
privacy protection.").
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to remain silent. The idea is that disclosure of information by some
people can reveal information about other people, to their detriment.
A striking example is the revelation of people's sexual orientation
through an analysis of their social network friends.'s Another example
is the unraveling of privacy protections in the context of eligibility
decisions, where those with a favored characteristic have an incentive
to disclose, thereby outing those who remain silent. Non-smokers are
happy to tell insurance companies about their healthy habits, thereby
identifying the smokers. These contexts and the use of data analytics
to discover information about people other than the data subject are
pervasive and likely to grow more common as the power of data
analytics increases.
While the idea that data analytics can reveal previously hidden
information about a data subject has been treated in the literature
extensively,16 there has not been sufficient attention paid to the idea
that certain contexts of information disclosure and data analytics can
reveal information about people other than the data subject.17 This
external effect undermines the normative appeal of the informed
consent model. It is no longer only the data subject's interest that is at
stake in information disclosure, but the interests of other people who
are not parties to the transaction. A focus on privacy externalities also
provides some explanation of why people seem to care about the
privacy decisions that others make.'8
The notion of a negative privacy externality does not rely on
intangible non-quantifiable feelings of privacy violations, and it allows
the conceptualization of privacy as inherently social. Under this
conception, privacy concerns can express reservations about an
indefinitely large class of possible economic harms that the mere
refusal to disclose would not avoid. Even when individuals have the
15 See Matthew Moore, Gay Men 'Can Be Identified by Their Facebook Friends', THE
TELEGRAPH, Sept. 21, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/621359o/Gay-men-can-be-identified-
by-their-Facebook-friends.html.
16 See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises ofPrivacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure
ofAnonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2009).
17 One exception is T.Z. Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using Implementation-
Based Solutions for the Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of Data Mining and
the Internet Society, 56 ME. L. REV. 13,42-46 (2004).
11 See Luc Wathien, Marketing and Privacy Concerns, (Harvard Business School Working
Paper, 2006), for an assessment of these "indirect privacy concerns." available at:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.o6.4252&rep=repl&type=pdf.
2011] 429
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
ability to refuse data collection requests, if enough other people go
along with the information collection and use scheme, the economic
damage is done.
An unfairness framework for privacy needs to supplement the
informed consent model. If the harm done by negative privacy
externalities is substantial, then individual choice might have to be
restricted. Simply getting informed consent would not make an
information practice legitimate. One way to structure an unfairness
framework is by dividing the collection and use of information into
three categories. Impermissible collection and use of information is so
harmful that even with data subject consent it should not be
permitted. Public benefit use of information is so important that it
should be allowed even without data subject consent. In between lies
the realm of consent, where information can be collected and used
subject to an opt-in or opt-out regime. An opt-in regime would make
sense for the information uses that are closer to the impermissible
uses and opt-out would be adopted for the information uses closer to
the public benefit use. In effect, unfairness acts as a floor, blocking
some information uses from reaching the level of individual choice.
The standard adopted under the Federal Trade Commission Act is
used for determining unfairness in this privacy regulation model: an
information practice would be unfair when it imposes substantial
injury on consumers that is not easily avoidable and which does not
have compensating benefits.19
Two examples illustrate how such an unfairness framework
functions in other contexts. The first example is information security
policy. Information security policy does not rely on informed consent.
If data controllers do not keep information secure, the Federal Trade
Commission treats this as an unfair practice and requires reasonable
security procedures. The second example is financial regulation.
Financial regulation no longer relies exclusively on disclosure. Some
lending and credit card practices are simply prohibited as unfair. No
amount of disclosure can render them legitimate. The focus in these
cases is not on consent, but on whether a practice imposes substantial
injury on consumers that they cannot reasonably avoid and which has
no compensating benefits.
The contrast between the models of privacy regulation can be seen
by examining the privacy issues raised by online behavioral
advertising and social networks. The informed consent model focuses
on the nature of disclosure and the kind of choice involved. It would
19 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006).
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encourage or require more flexible, transparent, and granular notice
and choice-going well beyond the unread, uninformative privacy
notices that have characterized the older privacy regimes. It would
impose a default allowing use in some cases and blocking it in others.
In contrast, the unfairness model asks what the information
collected is used for and what benefits and harms can result from that
use. If targeted ads can substantially increase online revenue, then
online behavioral advertising contributes to the continued free
delivery of online content, including for online outposts of newspapers
that face an economic crisis. A choice regime that unduly restricts
online behavioral advertising might be very damaging to the
continued deployment of diverse online content.
On the other hand, the biggest dangers associated with online
behavioral advertising might come from the possible secondary use of
the profiles and analytics constructed to enable targeted advertising.
An unfairness regime would look at these possible secondary uses and
try to assess which ones might be damaging. For example, the use of
these profiles for eligibility decisions related to employment,
insurance or credit might curtail the widespread, open and robust use
of the Internet itself Policymakers might want to weigh this risk
against any likely benefit in improved predictions on eligibility
decisions; they might ultimately determine that, on balance, this use
was so harmful it should not be allowed. However, if it makes sense to
allow these uses, then it makes sense to make sure that they fall under
the right regulatory regime, such as the rules and protections provided
by the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA").
The same point that policymakers have to assess secondary
information uses applies to privacy issues involving social networks.
Profiles are already being constructed by companies based upon
information derived from social networks and are apparently being
used to guide decisions involving the marketing and granting of credit.
More granular and flexible privacy notice and choice regimes have
been proposed as the way to deal with privacy in social networks. But
the unfairness model suggests a different approach that would require
the active and direct involvement of public policymakers in the
assessment of the secondary uses of information gathered by social
networks. The proposed privacy law in Germany that would restrict
the use of Facebook information in the employment context illustrates
this unfairness approach. In order to protect the social network
context itself and the individuals who use it, the proposed law does
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not allow individual choice about the use of Facebook information for
employment purposes.2 0
Part II of this paper describes the limitations on the informed
consent model, arguing that informed consent is neither necessary nor
sufficient to make an information practice legitimate. A crucial section
in Part II explores the idea of negative privacy externalities,
illustrating several examples of indirect disclosure of information
about individuals and describing the ways in which this can harm
individuals through invidious discrimination, group harm, inefficient
product variety, restrictions on access, and price discrimination. Part
III outlines the unfairness model, explores the three-part test for
unfairness under the Federal Trade Commission Act, and compares
the model to similar privacy frameworks that have been proposed as
additions to or replacements for the informed consent model. Part IV
explores how to apply the unfairness framework to some current
privacy issues involving online behavioral advertising and social
networks. Part IV sums up the argument and urges policymakers to
evaluate directly the outcomes of information use, and not focus solely
on creating an ideal information collection process.
II. THE LIMITATIONS ON INFORMED CONSENT
A. PREMISES OF THE INFORMED CONSENT MODEL
The informed consent model can be summed up in two
propositions: informed consent is necessary to obtain legitimacy and
it is sufficient to obtain legitimacy. With informed consent, any
information collection and use practice is legitimate. Without it, no
information collection and use practice is legitimate. There might be
other rules relating to the fair use of information, but the heart of the
informed consent model is this intimate connection between
legitimacy and consent. 2 1
20 David Jolly, Germany Plans Limits on Facebook Use in Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20lo/o8/26/business/global/26fbook.html.
21 The original fair information practices developed by the U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) express this idea of informed consent. Three of the five
HEW principles focus on knowledge of data collection and use are: 1. there must be no
personal data record keeping systems whose very existence is secret, 2. there must be a way
for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and how it is used,
3.there must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that was
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his
consent. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECt'S ADVISORY
CoM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYS., RECORDS, COMPUTER, AND THE RIGHTS OF
[Vol. 6:3432
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Individual consent is the essence of the current approach to
privacy policy for several reasons. First, the other fair information
practice principles do not relate to whether the collection and use of
information itself is legitimate. The security safeguard principle, for
example, is designed to prevent unauthorized access to information.
Its goal is to protect data subjects from harms such as fraud and
identity theft. The access and correction and the data quality
principles are aimed at providing individuals with the opportunity to
correct the record and to block the use of inaccurate or out-of-date
information. Second, the other principles such as openness, individual
participation, collection limitation, and so on are aimed to establish,
maintain, and reinforce the ability of individuals to make informed
judgments about the collection and use of data. The justification of
limits on secondary use, for example, is not that these uses are
improper but that people cannot exercise choice about secondary uses
unless they are first presented with a description of the possible uses
and asked to accept them.
Informed consent has endured as the touchstone of privacy policy
because it is based on two compelling ideas: that privacy has to do
with the control of information about data subjects and that people
have different privacy preferences. If an institution has access to
detailed profiles about data subjects, this gives it the power to make
decisions that might adversely affect the interests of those data
subjects. Privacy has something to do with restoring some control to
the data subjects in this situation. Alan Westin focused on this aspect
of privacy as control and is responsible more than anyone else for the
modern focus on control as an essential aspect of privacy.22
CITIZENS vii (1973), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1977privacy/toc.htm. It is
also contained in the 1980 OECD guidelines. See OECD, GUIDELINES ON THE PROT. OF
PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERS. DATA, Oct. 1, 1980. The collection limitation,
use limitation and openness principles all seem to require consent. OECD, PRIVACY
GUIDELINES,
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/O,2340,en_2649-34255-1815186_1 1a_1,oo.html.
The 1995 European Union Data Protection Directive contains it as well. See Council
Directive 95/46/EC, On the Protection ofIndividuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 95 [hereinafter
European Data Protection Directive]. The purpose limitation and transparency principles
relate to knowledge and consent.
22 The modern starting point for this notion of information privacy as control is Westin,
supra note 11, at 7 where he defines information privacy as "the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others."
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But people differ in the extent to which they care about privacy.
Some do not want anyone else to know what they are up to, some are
happy to let the world know, and most people think it depends on the
situation. Again, Alan Westin is the prime mover in establishing,
through a series of surveys going back decades, that people vary in
their privacy preferences.23
Informed consent marries the two ideas: if people control the
information flow, they can protect information according to their own
preferences.
Public policy under an informed consent model examines a variety
of disclosure questions. But the basic questions are only two: Is the
quality of the disclosure adequate in terms of clarity, conspicuousness
and timeliness? Is the type of choice provided (take-it-or-leave-it, opt-
in, opt-out) appropriate for the type of information collected and the
uses to which it is put? Once satisfied about the quality of disclosure
and the conditions of choice, policymakers are done with their
evaluation of the legitimacy of an information practice.
The informed consent model is entirely focused on the individual.
No policymaker looks at information use and decides whether it is
good or bad. Knowledge of what is done with information collected
has to be provided to individuals but not to government officials.
Evaluation of information uses is done entirely by individuals. With
enough disclosure about information uses, and the right sort of
mechanisms for consent, people are individually empowered to decide
which uses of information are worth it for them to consent to. The
sum total of these individual decisions determines the nature and size
of information collection and use in society. Policymakers focus on
making sure that the conditions are right for individual-level choice
and do not themselves engage in substantive evaluation of
information uses.
The informed choice has two components: a sufficiency prong and
a necessity prong. An information practice is legitimate if and only if
the data subject has rendered informed consent to the practice. The
sufficiency prong is that once the requirements of informed consent
are satisfied, the use of the information is legitimate. Informed
consent makes an information practice legitimate. The other part of
the informed consent model is necessity. There has to be informed
23 Based on a series of surveys, Alan Westin developed a privacy index describing people as
(1) High and Fundamentalist, (2) Medium and Pragmatist, or (3) Low and Unconcerned.
See Ponnurangam Kumaraguru & Lorrie Faith Cranor, Privacy Indexes: A Survey of
Westin's Studies, (Inst. for Software Res. Int'l, Technical Report, CMU-ISRI-5-138) (2005),
available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~ponguru/CMU-ISRI-o-138.pdf.
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consent. Otherwise, the practice, no matter how benign or beneficial,
is unacceptable. This necessity prong of the informed consent model
expresses the idea that secret gathering of data profiles and their use
for unannounced purposes without the knowledge and consent of the
data subjects is the essence of information privacy harm.
B. GENERAL CRITICISMS OF THE INFORMED CONSENT MODEL
One line of criticism of the informed consent model is that it is
expensive and impractical. The financial privacy notices that were
required by federal legislation following the passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act's privacy requirements illustrate the weakness of the
disclosure approach.24 Billions of dollars were spent designing,
testing, and mailing annual privacy notices that almost no one reads
and that are virtually incomprehensible if read; the total cost has been
estimated at between $2 and $5 billion per year.2 5 In 2001, the trade
association America's Community Banks estimated that the "average
compliance cost was $1.37 per customer, with total estimated
compliance costs per bank ranging widely from as little as $1,ooo to
more than $2 million."26 No one's privacy is furthered by these empty
requirements for formal notification. If the goal was to induce people
to opt out of certain information sharing practices, it has failed. Fewer
than 5% of those receiving notices chose to opt out of third-party
information sharing.27 The condemnation of the approach is from
both privacy advocates28 and critics of the idea of privacy rights.29
24Cate, supra note 12, at 365.
251d. (noting that financial privacy notices cost an estimated $2-5 billion).
27An Examination of The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Five Years After Its Passage before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, io8th Cong. 43 (2004) (prepared
statement of Harry P. Doherty, Vice Chairman of the Board, Independence Cmty. Bank
Corp).
27 Cate, supra note 12, at 361.
28 See Tena Friery & Beth Givens, 2ooi: The GLB Odyssey-We're Not There Yet: How
Consumers Rial Privacy Notices and Recommendations for Improving Them, (Dec. 4,
2001) (unpublished comments from Get Noticed: Effective Financial Privacy Notices, FTC
public workshop),available at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/fp-glb-ftc.htm (describing
the financial privacy notices as "a costly experiment that resulted in little effective
education of the public about the rights to privacy of personal financial information under
GLB").
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Privacy policies on the Internet are equally unread. As of 2002,
Yahoo reported that less than 1% of its visitors read its privacy
policy.3o Google's recent attempt to provide more granular privacy
notices and its ability to control how visitors are categorized has
attracted tens of thousands of people per week, but that is a "tiny
fraction of the user base of the world's largest search engine."31 This is
a good thing. These policies are also virtually incomprehensible and
astonishingly costly to read. Researchers at Carnegie Mellon
concluded that if all U.S. consumers read all the privacy policies for all
the websites they visited just once a year, the total amount of time
spent on just reading the policies would be 53.8 billion hours per year
and the cost to the economy of the time spent doing this would be
$781 billion per year.32
Additional objections to the informed consent model based on the
practicalities of informing people and obtaining their consent are well
taken. For example, how is consent for secondary use supposed to be
obtained without using the very information that is at issue?33
The development and growth of data collection, aggregation and
analytics over the last decade also make informed consent impractical.
It no longer seems reasonable to expect people to fully understand
how information about them can flow, how it can be analyzed and how
29 See Timothy Muris, Chairman, FTC, Remarks at the Privacy 2001 Conference, Protecting
Consumers' Privacy: 2002 and Beyond, (Oct. 4, 2001) (stating that "acres of trees died to
produce a blizzard of barely comprehensible privacy notices.").
30 Cate, supra note 12, at 361.
31See Dan Perry, Google Executive Pushes Privacy Concerns, ABCNEWS.COM, Oct. 26,
2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=11975665. Google's chief privacy
officer, Peter Fleisher, is quoted as saying he is "puzzled" about why more people don't use
the dashboard's privacy controls.
32 McDonald & Cranor, supra, note 13, at 17. The authors do not treat their study as an
argument against notice-and-choice, but as an indication that privacy has to be made
easier to understand.
33 As Cate notes, "[Miost mailing lists are obtained from third parties. For a secondary user
to have to contact every person individually to obtain consent to use the names and
addresses on the list would cause delay, require additional contacts with consumers, and
almost certainly prove prohibitively expensive. And it could not be done without using the
very information that the secondary user is seeking consent to use. Cate, supra note 12, at
362. This article also details the difficulties for telephone companies to obtain consent to
analyze calling patterns to offer them new services, id. at 361, the difficulties of credit card
companies in reaching consumers to ask consent to assess their eligibility for credit offers,
id. at 364, and the difficulties of charities in reaching out to their potential donors, id. at
365.
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it can be used to adversely affect their own interests. 34 Fully informed
consent to protect the release of information about a data subject is no
longer a reasonable goal.
More fundamental criticisms of the informed consent model have
been made as well. It is worth spelling out these limitations in two
parts, matching with the two prongs of the informed consent model.
In the next Sections, I look at these more fundamental criticisms,
arguing that informed consent is neither necessary nor sufficient to
make an information practice legitimate.
C. CONTEXTS IN WHICH INFORMED CONSENT Is NOT NECESSARY
The informed consent approach fails to accommodate
circumstances where consent is not required in order for an
information collection and use practice to be legitimate. This is not a
34 See Weitzner et al., supra, note 12, at 1. Lundblad and Masiello make a similar point:
"According to some, online interactions and web-based information linkages have become
so complicated that it is increasingly difficult to provide consumers truly meaningful
notice-and-choice." Nicklas Lundblad & Betsy Masiello, Opt-in Dystopias, 7 SCRIPTED 155
(2010), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol7-1/lundblad.asp. Other
studies demonstrate the ease with which people can be identified from supposedly
anonymous data sets. See, e.g., Latanya Sweeney, Uniqueness ofSimple Demographics in
the U.S. Population (Lab. for Int'l Data Privacy, Working Paper No. LIDAP-WP4 (2000)
(arguing that 87.1% of the U.S. population can be identified by their zip code, date of birth
and gender); Ohm, supra, note 16. The Wall Street Journal's series on "What They Know"
investigated the various ways in which online entities are able to find out information
about you. See, e.g., Justin Scheck, Stalkers Exploit Cell Phone GPS, WALL ST. J., Aug.2,
2010 available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBloool4240527487034673o4575383522318244234.html?
mod=WSJ-articleRecentColumnsWhatTheyKnow. Browser settings are another way in
which people can be identified by websites they visit. See Erik Larson, Browser
Fingerprints: A Big Privacy Threat, PC WORLD, Mar. 27, 2010, available at
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/03271o-browser-fingerprints-a-big-
privacy.html. The Electronic Frontier Foundation has a test to determine how unique your
browser settings are. When I took the test in August 2010, I had a browser fingerprint that
was unique among the 1,126,161 visitors tested up until that point. The EFF test can be
taken at https://panopticlick.eff.org/index.php?action=log&js= yes. The Wall Street
Journal also reports that companies like [x + 1] have technology that enables websites to
identify crucial characteristics of their visitors including in one case that that a visitor was
"a young Colorado Springs parent who lives on about $50,ooo a year, shops at Wal-Mart
and rents kids' videos." Emily Steel & Julia Angwan, On the Web's Cutting Edge,
Anonymity in Name Only, WALL ST, J., Aug. 4, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBloool4240527487o32949045753855321o919o198.html?
mod=WSJ articleRecentColumnsWhatTheyKnow. While not revealing the name of
website visitors, enough accurate information was revealed so as to enable credit card
companies to target their offers. Id.
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matter of it being too expensive to tell people about a practice and
obtain their consent. In some cases, people should not have the ability
to reject information collection and use because this will block uses of
information that have important public benefits that we want to allow.
It is useful to review a few examples of this.
The FCRA35 was designed to regulate the activities of data
collectors and to protect the data subjects. It involved trade-offs
between the need for this information to be collected and used and the
interests of data subjects. One significant trade-off was the restriction
of the ability of individuals to block the use of information about them
in credit reporting files. Files can be furnished only for permissible
purposes, which include employment screening, insurance
underwriting, credit granting, and child support payments. 36 The file
can also be released with the written consent of the data subject, but
such consent is not required. The permissible uses of information for
eligibility decisions that the Fair Credit Reporting Act includes do not
allow data subjects to block these uses by withholding consent. The
reason is straightforward. Credit reporting agencies gather
information about individuals in order to assess their suitability for
insurance, credit access, and employment. Their files contain both
positive and negative information about people and provide the ability
to assess the risk involved in making people eligible. If people who
were bad risks were able to withhold information from these agencies,
the files would lose a large part of their value for these purposes.37
The Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA") was passed to
prevent states from selling drivers' license records or otherwise
releasing to the public the information collected as part of the
licensing procedure. It was passed in response to public concern about
these practices, some of which created a threat to the safety of
particular individuals. The DPPA allows only certain permissible uses
of drivers' license records and does not allow the data subject to stop
these permissible uses. These uses include legitimate government
agency functions, certain legitimate business needs, uses in
connection with court proceedings, certain research and insurance
activities, and for any other legitimate State use if it relates to motor
35 Fair Credit Reporting Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
36 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
37 J. Howard Beales, III and Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting
Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, ii6 17 (20o8) (hereinafter
Beales and Muris).
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vehicle or public safety. DPPA allows release of the information if the
state has obtained express consent from the individual, but it does not
require this consent for other permissible uses.38
Title V of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of 1999 ("GLBA") provides
for various privacy protections for consumers of financial service
institutions. In particular, it provides for notice and the opportunity to
opt-out of various information sharing and use practices. For
instance, it allows consumers to opt-out of information sharing with
unaffiliated third parties.39 There are a number of circumstances when
the law does not allow the consumer to opt out of information sharing,
including:
* to protect the confidentiality or security of the
financial institution's records pertaining to the
consumer, the service or product, or the
transaction therein;
* to protect against or prevent actual or potential
fraud, unauthorized transactions, claims, or
other liability;
* for required institutional risk control, or for
resolving customer disputes or inquiries;
* to persons holding a legal or beneficial interest
relating to the consumer;
* to persons acting in a fiduciary or
representative capacity on behalf of the
consumer.40
The idea behind these exceptions is that the sharing of
information with third parties for these purposes has benefits to the
consumer and to society that outweigh the interest in allowing the
38 Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 8 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006). See further information
and background at The Drivers Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) and the Privacy of Your
State Motor Vehicle Record, Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr, http://epic.org/privacy/drivers (last
visited March 14, 2011).
39 Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1) (2oo6).
40 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(3).
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consumer to block sharing. For instance, fraud control measures that
would benefit all consumers might be adversely impacted if a large
number of consumers blocked the sharing of information for data
analysis to detect patterns of unauthorized use. Sharing of
information is also allowed with the consent or at the direction of the
consumer, but this consent is not required for the purposes listed
above.41
These illustrative examples and others42 indicate that consent of
the opt-in or opt-out variety is not always necessary to establish the
legitimacy of an information practice. Two general conditions seem to
call for limitations on informed consent. One is when obtaining
consent is so expensive that it would render a particular use
uneconomic and this use is socially beneficial. Another is when the
major value of the information is its completeness. In these
circumstances, allowing individuals to opt out of the use would
prevent the use.
Even without individual consent, rules can be established
regarding the use of information that allow only those uses that are of
net benefit to the public. Unlike the informed consent model of public
policy decisionmaking, however, this requires policymakers to directly
confront the question of the social value of the information use.
D. CONTEXTS IN WHICH INFORMED CONSENT Is NOT SUFFICIENT
The other prong of the informed consent approach is that consent
can make any information practice legitimate. As one privacy scholar
put it, this idea embodies "the anti-paternalist intuition that free and
anticipated uses of personal information do not rise to the level of
privacy harms."43 Even as astute an observer of privacy issues as
Daniel Solove treats consent as curing all or most evils in information
use: "The activities that affect privacy often are not inherently
41 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(2).
42 Public records also are available for public use without the consent of the data subject.
Court records, property records and the like are available to the public and should not be
withheld at the sole discretion of the data subject. The draft Boucher privacy bill provides
an exemption from notice-and-choice for "operational uses" which include improving a
service, using analytics to improve a service and preventing fraud and unauthorized
transactions. See Boucher Draft, supra note 5, at 4.
43 M. Ryan Calo, A Hybrid Conception of Privacy Harm Draft - Privacy Law Scholars
Conference 2010, p. a8. See also id. at 27 ("It is not a privacy harm to use someone's
information where they understood and agreed to that use.").
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problematic. When a person consents to most of these activities, there
is no privacy violation."44 The issue for many defenders of the
informed consent model is whether consent is really valid. Within this
model, there is no room for the idea that, even with valid, robust
consent, there could be a privacy problem.
Some privacy scholars return to the choice model even when
multiple parties have a legitimate claim to have a privacy interest that
requires consent. Such cases arise in the context of autobiographies,
disclosures under sexual predator laws, disclosures under the
Freedom of Information Act, and in every-day cases where people tag
each other's photographs on social network sites. One way to handle
these cases where affected parties do not agree on disclosure is to
locate the party best able to resolve the privacy issue or whose privacy
interest should prevail.45
Many critics of notice and choice also accept the idea that consent
is a remedy for any information use. Beales and Muris, for example,
champion an approach to privacy based on consequences not choice,
but they have not broken this hold that the notice and choice model
has on their thinking:
If consumers knew that data given to one agency would
be matched to data from another agency and they had a
choice about whether to provide the data or allow the
match, then it is very difficult to see how a privacy
problem could exist. The converse, however, does not
follow. That is, the absence of a privacy problem when
consumers understand and have a choice about the
information collection or use does not imply that a
privacy problem exists whenever consumers are
44Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, in UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 102 (Harv. Univ.
Press 2008).
45 See generally Lior Strahilevitz, Collective Privacy, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH,
PRIVACY AND REPUTATION 217, (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., Hary. Univ.
Press 2010). Although he recognizes "collective action problems" in privacy, id. at 218,
where "multiple people possess a privacy interest in the same information," Id. at 220, he
proposes to resolve these problems by allowing consent of a favored party to decide the
question. Id. at 232. The key is to answer the question of "whose privacy counts?" Id. at
232, thereby "restoring consent to the central position it occupies in the rest of privacy
law," id. at 234-235.
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ignorant of the information use or lack a choice about
it.46
Their real target is not choice itself, but the idea that choice is
required for good privacy policy. As we have seen in the previous
section, they are largely right about this. But they fully accept the idea
that there is an "absence of a privacy problem when consumers
understand and have a choice about the information collection or
use."47
To see that, even where it is necessary, informed consent may not
be sufficient for making an information practice legitimate, it is
worthwhile to consider the informed consent program that governs
participation in research experiments funded by the government. In
this framework, institutional review boards must evaluate proposed
research and approve it when it meets certain conditions. One of these
conditions is ascertaining that informed consent has been obtained
and documented. Informed consent is obtained in various ways, and it
requires a full explanation of the nature of the research and the
risks.48
This framework treats informed consent as necessary, subject to
various exceptions, including the need for action in emergency
situations. But informed consent is not by itself sufficient. Other
factors must be taken into account including efforts to minimize risk,
to balance risk against benefit, and to ensure data confidentiality.
Proposed research projects can be rejected when risk levels are too
high or where the level of risk is not justified by compensating
benefits.49 In this area, informed consent does not always render the
underlying activity legitimate.5o
46 Beales & Muris, supra, note 37, at 113.
47 Id.
48 See Protection of Human Subjects, 21 C.F.R. § 50 (2010). The disclosures that must be
made to potential subjects include a statement explaining the purposes of the research and
the procedures to be followed, a description of any reasonably foreseeable risks to the
subject, a description of any reasonably foreseeable benefits to the subject or to others, a
disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures, a statement describing the extent, if
any, to which confidentiality of records identifying the subject will be maintained, and a
statement that participation is voluntary, that refusal to participate will involve no penalty
or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled, and that the subject may
discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which the
subject is otherwise entitled. Id.
49 See Institutional Review Boards, 21 C.F.R. § 56 (2010). IRBs are required to ensure
several condifions are satisfied before approving a project, including that risks to subjects
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A variety of considerations have led scholars to the conclusion that
merely obtaining informed consent does not render an information
practice legitimate. Some commentators come to this conclusion by
reflecting on the importance of privacy as a social good, concluding
that in some circumstances "coercing privacy" would be justified. 51
The idea is that individual choice in this area would lead, in a
piecemeal fashion, to the erosion of privacy protections that are the
foundation of the democratic regime, which is the heart of our
political system.5 2 Individuals are making an assessment-at least
implicitly-of the advantages and disadvantages to them of sharing
information. They are determining that information sharing is, on
balance, a net gain for them. But the aggregate effect of these
decisions is to erode the expectation of privacy and also the role of
privacy in fostering self-development, personhood, and other values
that underlie the liberal way of life. In this way, individual choices are
not sufficient to justify information practices that collectively
undermine widely shared public values.53
Others look at imbalances of bargaining power and knowledge
asymmetries in the marketplace and conclude that choice in those
circumstances is not reflective of consent. Collectors of information
know what can be done with it or how it can be combined with other
pieces of information to create profiles that have substantial economic
value. Data subjects typically have no such knowledge and it is
unreasonable to expect them to acquire it. This imbalance in the
marketplace suggests that relying on individual choice alone will not
are minimized, risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, selection
of subjects is equitable, that the research plan makes adequate provision for monitoring
the data collected to ensure the safety of subjects and that there are adequate provisions to
protect the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data. Id. Obtaining
informed consent is only one element in determining the acceptability of a research
project. Id.
50 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has adopted an IRB-like mechanism
for controlling privacy risks. DARPA S & T Privacy Principles,
http://www.darpa.mil/principles.html (last visited March 14, 2010). It has a established an
"Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (ELSI) Working Group with the National Science
Foundation that will identify, analyze and address the ELSI of personally identifiable
information during scientific and development activities." They describe this board as an
"extension of the Institutional Review Board model of shared responsibility." Id.
51 Anita Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 723 (1999).
52d. at 728.
so Id. at 740. See also PRISCILLA REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 225-27 (1995).
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protect people from harms in the use of information. Once again,
consent does not render the underlying information practice
legitimate.54
Others reject the sufficiency prong by noting that even consensual
decision making would reinforce patterns of inequality that are
inimical to a just society. When information can be used to grant or
withhold access to goods and services, to positions and offices of
responsibility, or to employment opportunities, society has
traditionally banned explicit discrimination based upon protected
categories such as religion, race, and gender. 55 But these protected
categories are correlated with other information about people.s6 The
apparently neutral section criteria that underlie the "panoptic sort"
will simply reproduce the invidious discrimination that has been
explicitly banned.57Alternatively, the distribution pattern created by
this sorting will be arbitrary from a moral point of view because it is
not based on criteria that are demonstrably relevant to the decision at
hand. Individuals typically consent to the gathering of information
about them in the context of their daily transactions. But this consent
does not justify the aggregation of this information into profiles that
can generate widespread patterns of social and economic
discrimination.
I want to draw attention to and emphasize another way in which
informed consent does not legitimize the use of information. These
are contexts that exhibit substantial privacy externalities. The
approach taken here is not in contradiction to the above objections to
informed consent. It builds on many of their insights. It focuses,
however, on ways that an individual's fully informed consent about
54 SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 82-85; see also Nehf, supra note 15, at 61-66.
ss OSCAR GANDY, THE PANOPTIC SORT 200-01 (1993). Lior Strahilevitz rejects this
perspective arguing that it is better to use "unproblematic" criteria such as purchasing
patterns or Internet browsing behavior instead of the "old standbys - race, gender and
age." Lior Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal
Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1667 (2008). But these criteria might still reflect and
reinforce patterns of discrimination and so not be unproblematic neutral standards but
simply disguised proxies for the old standbys. Even if this is not the case, as Helen
Nissenbaum says, these criteria represent "arbitrary" ways of determining access to goods,
services and opportunities unless they can be shown to have some rational relationship to
the decision being made. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY,
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 209 (Stanford University Press 2010).
56 Id.
57GANDY, supra note 55.
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information collection and use can have harmful consequences-for
others. The decision of the individual is fully rational, not a function of
defective heuristic biases or based on misleading or incomplete
information. But it has harmful external consequences for others that
need to be taken into account in evaluating the collection and use of
information. The following Section develops these points.
E. NEGATIVE PRIVACY EXTERNALITIES
1. CONCEPT OF NEGATIVE PRIVACY EXTERNALITIES
People have privacy interests that can be adversely affected even
when they do not reveal information about themselves and when
others do not reveal information about them either. For instance, if a
person does not reveal his sexual orientation, but his Facebook friends
do, his sexual orientation is thereby revealed.58 In one study, a person
did not say anything about his sexual orientation; neither did his
friends. His sexual orientation was revealed to external observers,
however, who put together separate pieces of information and
analyzed them.59 Similar inferences about people, in the absence of
self-revelation or explicit revelation by others, can be made in a wide
variety of circumstances. This Section explores the privacy harms that
can result from these information leakages.
Privacy harms of this kind are negative privacy externalities. They
are not a separate kind of harm in addition to physical, financial and
other tangible harms that can occur to individuals. Negative privacy
externalities are these individual harms that are imposed upon
individuals by privacy choices made by others.60
Privacy externalities are composite. They consist of an information
externality together with an evaluation of that externality as harmful.
The first step in understanding negative privacy externalities is to
understand how data collectors, aggregators, and analysts can infer
information about individuals, even when these individuals do not
reveal that information themselves, when others do not divulge it
58See Moore, supra note 15.
59 Id.
6o For a good general account of externalities see RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE
THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS AND CLUB GOODS 3-25 (Cambridge University
Press 1996) (1986). In this way, privacy externalities differ from the harm to social goods
emphasized by Allen and Regan.
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either, and when it is not specifically recorded in public or private
databases to which they have access. This leakage might be described
as an information externality. Many commentators and privacy
scholars have pointed out the ways that information about the data
subject can be combined with other information and linked to
supposedly anonymous databases. Without realizing it, individuals
can expose vast quantities of information about themselves, simply
because they do not know what can be done with the information
about themselves that they do reveal.61
The notion of an information externality is different. An
information externality occurs when one person's revelation of
information reveals something about someone else. One hypothetical
example further illustrates the concept. Suppose from public data
records, it can be inferred that one of two people was involved in a
particular transaction and that the person who engaged in the
particular transaction was right-handed. If one of the two people
discloses that he is left-handed, he or she thereby discloses that the
other person engaged in the transaction. 62 The person disclosing the
information said nothing about the ultimate data subject; he said
nothing about the transaction either. He simply said he was left-
handed. The ultimate data subject did not disclose anything about
himself either. The structure of information available to the researcher
enabled an inference that neither of the two individuals involved
intended.
Another example illustrates the way in which indirect information
disclosures depend on the baseline quantity and structure of
information available to the data collector and analyst. Suppose a
marketer knows certain facts about a woman such as that she searches
on Google for baby clothes and diapers. It would be a reasonable
inference that she is pregnant and perhaps a good target for ads
relating to these items. The marketer also knows that the pregnant
woman's own mother is about to become a grandmother. The
pregnant woman's internet browsing behavior has revealed a fact
about her own mother that her mother never revealed to anyone.
6 One striking example of this is the willingness of people to reveal answers to common
security questions on their social network pages. See Americans Exposing Answers to
Common Security Questions and Identities on Social Networks, ID ANALYTICS, Nov. 9,
2010, http://www.idanalytics.com/news-and-events/news-releases/2o1o/11-5-20o.php.
62Thanks to Ed Felton for this "teaching" example.
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Indeed, the grandmother-to-be might not even be aware of her
daughter's pregnancy. 63
This effect on the knowledge available about others is what
distinguishes an information externality from other data leakages that
might affect only the discloser. I want to draw attention to this
phenomenon and point out its importance for the concept of privacy
as control of information about yourself and the associated informed
consent model for privacy regulation.
By itself this information leakage is neutral. It might result in a
benefit or a loss to the data subject, depending on how the
information is used. The second step in understanding negative
privacy externalities is to understand some of the ways in which this
indirectly obtained information can be used to the detriment of the
data subject. When this happens, the information externality is
negative and can be described as a negative privacy externality.
When privacy is thought about as involving an externality, it is
inherently social because privacy decisions made by some actors
inevitably affect the economic interests of others. Even if a choice
could be made easily and at modest cost, it might still be the wrong
way to set privacy policy if there are substantial negative privacy
externalities. Individual level choices will result in data collection and
use patterns that impose substantial tangible costs on individuals who
are not directly involved in making those choices. At the individual
level, one person's data disclosure choices affect others; at the social
level, the data choices of a substantial number of people, perhaps a
majority, might adversely affect the remainder of the population.
This notion of privacy externalities differs from the one typically
encountered in the literature. Analysts such as Hal Varian, 64 Peter
Swire,6 1 and Dennis Hirsch 66 argue that companies collecting personal
information impose a negative externality on consumers. These
63 SeCharles Petersen, Google and Money!, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKs, Dec. 9, 2010. Marketers
could use this information about the grandmother-to-be to target her with ads about
diapers.
64 See Hal Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, (Dec. 6, '996) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/privacy.
65 PETER SWIRE AND ROBERT LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINEsS 7-8, (Brookings Institution
Press 1998).
66 Dennis Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn
From Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 28 (2006), available at
http://www.1aw.capital.edu/Faculty/Bios/Hirsch%2privacy%20article.pdf.
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companies benefit from the information they collect, but do not face
the costs of the violation of consumers' privacy. As in standard cases
of externalities, the result is that they collect "too much" information.
Companies are able to use the "scarce" resource of other people's
information without paying them for the "privacy" costs imposed on
them. This externality problem can be addressed by giving people a
"property right" in their information. Then, companies could use it
only with their permission.67
The externality emphasized here is different. Here, an individual's
decision to share information with a data collector imposes costs on
other individuals. Individuals might have been given full "property
rights" over information about themselves; the notice involved can be
clear and conspicuous and timely, and the consent regime can be
extremely robust-a full opt-in with no information collection or use
without explicit prior informed consent. Even in those circumstances,
however, there is leakage of information about individuals who do not
themselves choose to reveal it. This indirectly revealed information
can then be used to impose an external cost on these individuals. A
system of property rights cannot correct an externality of this kind.
The notion of privacy externality used here also differs from the
collective privacy phenomena identified by scholars such as
Strahilevitz.68 In collective privacy situations, problems arise "where a
single source of confidential information reveals something about
multiple individuals, and these people disagree over whether the
information should be disseminated."69 In a typical example, one
individual tags multiple people in a photograph posted on Facebook
and then sets privacy controls so loosely that the information is
publicly revealed.70 But the concept extends to the familiar problem of
"kiss and tell" memoirs and other contexts such as ordinary
commercial transactions where "two participants in an interaction
have conflicting views about its private or public nature."71
67 There are substantial difficulties with this privacy externality analysis and the property
rights solution it proposes. In essence, it is a version of informed consent, and suffers from
all the difficulties of that approach that were discussed in the previous sections. Additional
criticisms are in SoLovE, supra note 2, at 76-92.
68 See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 45.
69d. at 217.
70 Id.
7Id. at 231.
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This concept is broad enough to include the true privacy
externalities. But it also includes unrelated phenomena. I do not want
to analyze phenomena where one person is directly disclosing
information about another person. The individual who tags the
photograph of another person is revealing information about that
other person. The person who discloses the identity and behavior of
his sexual partners is revealing information about them. The
merchant who discloses the identity and nature of a commercial
transaction with a customer is revealing information about that
customer. In the contrasting cases of true privacy externalities, the
data subject reveals information only about himself; he does not
disclose anything about others. Indeed, in the typical case, he does not
himself have the relevant information about others. For example, the
data subject knows his own sexual orientation and whether or not he
is a smoker and might be persuaded to reveal that information about
himself. He need not know and does not himself reveal information
about other people's sexual orientation or smoking behavior. It is a
true privacy externality because his disclosure of information about
himself allows analysts to make accurate inferences about the
smoking behavior of others.72
The use of information and analytics to construct a profile of
individuals has been noted before by many commentators. 73 The
72 Strahilevitz uses the notion of a genuine privacy externality, noting that "the
dissemination of sensitive information concerning an individual often affects particular
third parties by inferentially revealing information about them." Id. at 235. He discusses
the case of an incest victim whose identity is revealed by labeling her father as a
perpetrator of incest under a sexual predator disclosure statute. This case is an example of
a genuine privacy externality. The statutory disclosure about the father provides only the
name, photograph, address and "information specifying that he had been convicted of the
crime of incest." Id. at 232. With this information, the identity of the incest victim is
inferentially disclosed. But his general conception of a collective privacy phenomenon is
one where the privacy interests of several parties are implicated in the disclosure of a single
piece of information, which is broader than the notion of a true privacy externality. He
wants to respond to all these problems by reinvigorating the consent principle. He rejects
having the law treat those indirectly affected by data subject disclosures at least "as well as
it treats the individuals whose privacy is more obviously at stake" because he worries about
the effect on "speech and transparency interests" of giving these third parties a right to
block disclosure. Id. at 236. The fact that he can think of no way to honor the privacy
interests of these affected third parties demonstrates the hold that the consent model has
on his thinking. In fact, the kind of harm-based analysis he goes through in discussing kiss
and tell memoirs, id. at 231, presents exactly the kind of social decision making that can
provide protection of the privacy interests of both the data subject and the indirectly
affected third parties without having to rely on the consent of either.
73 Two useful surveys are SOLOVE, supra note 2, and SIMPsoN GARFINKEL, DATABASE
NATION (2000). See also Nehf, supra note 14, at 26.
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concerns expressed in these works emphasize that information left by
a person's "data trail"-his record of transactions, employment,
property ownership, marriage, divorce, debt repayment history and so
on-can impose costs on the individual and on society that are not
outweighed by any social benefits. It has been emphasized how
difficult it is to prevent the construction of these profiles by individual
caution and careful information control practices.74
The idea of privacy externalities adds a dimension to these
concerns about profiling. Even if some individuals do not contribute
information about themselves to these profiles, information provided
by others can be used to make inferences about them. These
inferences from indirectly revealed information can be added to
profiles and made available for further uses. It can be inferred from a
wide variety of sources even when not directly revealed by a data
subject. This can be seen very clearly in several different
circumstances. When a certain characteristic is relevant to the
eligibility decision, it is impossible for a candidate to keep the relevant
information secret. Scientific regularities about people also provide a
way to infer the presence of one characteristic from the presence of
others. If the data collector knows the independent variable in that
circumstance, it can use the regularity to infer the presence of the
dependent variable, even when the people involved have not revealed
the presence of that characteristic and it cannot be found in public
records. A special case of this type of scientific inference involves the
use of data analysis and data mining techniques to reveal otherwise
hidden characteristics or behavior patterns of groups of people. In the
next Subsection, I turn to a discussion of these information
externalities.
2. INFORMATION EXTERNALITIES
a. ELIGIBILITY DECISIONS
There are many cases involving eligibility where information
disclosure by some people reveals information about other people.
This can happen in several ways. When many people disclose whether
or not they have a given characteristic, but others do not respond to
the question, this can be evidence that those who failed to respond
have the characteristic in question. Thus, people who do not tell their
insurance company about their smoking habits become smokers.
74Strahilevitz, supra note 45.
450 [Vol. 6:3
MACCARTHY
College applicants who do not submit their SAT scores become
applicants with low scores. Potential renters who do not list their race
on the application form become members of a disfavored racial group.
Job applicants who do not disclose a disability or who refuse to take
medical tests that would reveal it become people with that disability. 75
The key element is that information that could affect an eligibility
decision can be expected to leak out in the context of fully informed
consent for information sharing. Those who can gain from
information sharing would rationally choose to reveal; those who
would be adversely affected might try to avoid the adverse effect by
remaining silent, but their silence is used as information against them.
When the information involves sensitive categories, law sometimes
restricts information sharing to prevent discrimination. Private
parties can also attempt to restrict information sharing to protect the
overall well-being of their members.
b. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Normal scientific research can determine that people with one
characteristic or group of characteristics have or have a high
probability of having another characteristic. These can be physical,
genetic, biological, demographic or social characteristics. Scientific
experiments and social science surveys are designed to establish these
empirical regularities.
Examples of these connections are numerous and varied. Research
has established elevated risk of certain diseases in certain
demographic groups.76 This research is often used to determine that
people are at risk of certain diseases or to suggest certain remedies.
Social science research can reveal substantial information about
people's motivations, beliefs, and habits and can relate characteristics
75 Posner has a discussion of information unraveling in the context of the Buckley
amendment in Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and the Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
245, 247 (20o8), available at
http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/issues/archive/v75/75_1/PosnerArticle.pdf ("A federal
statute forbids colleges and other educational institutions to reveal a student's grades
without his or her consent. Yet virtually all students give their consent because otherwise a
prospective employer is likely to assume the worst. (If no students disclosed voluntarily,
the employer would be stymied; but the best students have a strong incentive to disclose,
and once they disclose the next tier has a similar incentive, and so on until the entire
privacy policy unravels.)").
76 This is the case for Tay-Sachs disease among Ashkenazy Jews and sickle-cell anemia
among African Americans, for example.
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to demographic data, including age, race, religion, and national origin.
These connections and linkages are useful for analyzing social and
economic trends and planning for public investment projects such as
highways and schools.
Niche marketing uses standard social science research methods to
establish linkages among groups of people that can help to focus
marketing efforts on those most likely to respond to these efforts.
Some classes of customers are constructed, such as "young urban
professional" or "wealthy, retired widow," and a hypothesis is
developed that people in these groups will exhibit certain spending
patterns that reveal underlying preferences.77 The marketing
campaign will focus its efforts on the basis of these patterns. Voting
patterns are highly predictable in the same way. White Protestants
voted overwhelmingly for Republican candidates in the 2010
Congressional election.78 Latino and black voters, in contrast, voted
overwhelmingly for Democratic candidates.79 Political campaigns use
these social science research findings as a basis for targeting messages
and get-out-the-vote efforts to particular demographic groups.
The relevance for the questions of privacy externalities is that
many facts about people can be inferred from other facts about them.
The research that establishes these linkages is research on a subset of
a population. Even if only a small minority of data subjects within a
particular group are involved in the scientific research that establishes
a linkage between people in that group and some characteristic, trait
or behavior, all members of that group are affected. Members of other
groups might be affected as well. Once the scientific linkage is
established, data collectors, aggregators and analysts no longer need
to obtain information about that characteristic, trait or behavior from
the data subject or from public or private records of their activities.
They can infer the presence of that trait from the membership in the
group. They might even be able to infer the absence of that trait
among members of other groups.
Statistical inferences from membership in social networks are
possible as well. If researchers establish that people with obese friends
tend to be obese, then once it is known that a person's social network
77Zarsky, supra note 17, at 27.
78 Religion in the 2010 Elections, PEW RESEARCH CTR. PUBL'NS, Nov. 3, 2010,
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1791/2010-midterm-elections-exit-poll-religion-vote.
79 Latino Vote in the 2010 Elections, PEW RESEARCH CTR. PUBL'NS, Nov. 3, 2010,
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1790/201-midterm-elections-exit-poll-hispanic-vote.
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has a high percentage of obese people in it, it can be inferred that the
data subject is probably obese. In one study revealed, for example,
having obese friends makes it 57% more likely that a data subject is
obese.so And the effects spread through three degrees of separation. If
a data subject has friends of friends who are obese, he iS 20% more
likely to be obese. Third-degree obese friends make a data subject lo%
more likely to be obese. Similar influences can be made about
smoking, drinking and even happiness.
Studies of smoking show that as more and more people quit
smoking the remaining smokers are clustered in tight-knit groups
with few connections to non-smokers. Most non-smokers also have
few smoking friends. These facts provide a way for information about
people's smoking habits to unravel in an employment or insurance
context-even if the smoking condition is not explicitly made a
condition for eligibility for a job or insurance. A company can examine
a prospective employee's social network, and if they have even a
minimal amount of information on the smoking behavior of the group,
they can infer the prospect's smoking behavior with a reasonable
degree of certainty. Without explicitly asking anyone for it, they can
discover smoking behaviors.
Using the social network analysis for this purpose sounds sinister.
But the same analysis can help public health officials devise an
effective strategy for reducing smoking. It suggests for example that
do-not-smoke warnings are ineffective and the best way to help
smokers to quit is to get their friends to do it. An app has even been
developed for Facebook that enables a strategy like this: it publicizes
that a user of the app has stopped smoking, for how long and how
much money he has saved. 8' The problem is not the inference that is
made possible by scientific research but the purpose for which that
inferential knowledge is used.
so Clive Thompson, Are Your Friends Making You Fat?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at
MM28, paragraph 15. available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/O9/13/magazine/13contagion-
t.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
8
'See WEQUIT,
http://www.facebook.com/apps/application.php?id=33763416862&ref=search&sid= 7 07
107521.2497277038..1.
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c. DATA MINING
A particular application of social science research methods is
important enough to call for special treatment. These are the
analytical techniques that can reveal patterns in large and linked data
sets. It is through these techniques that data subjects often reveal
information about other people when they reveal information about
themselves.
Commentators break down the information flow patterns into
three parts. First is the data gathering phase. Second, is the data
analysis phase and third is the data use phase.82 The important phase
for understanding privacy externalities is the data analysis phase,
where a variety of statistical techniques are applied to aggregated and
linked data sets. Two varieties of these techniques are relevant. Data
analysis takes place when researchers break down the data into pre-
existing subcategories, hypothesize a connection among variables in
the data, test the hypothesis and either confirm or deny it. These are
the social science hypotheses discussed in the last section. 83
Data mining refers to the discovery of patterns within the data
itself without needing to formulate a hypothesis about what pattern
will emerge from the examination of the data. The correlations and
patterns discovered in the data are unpredictable in advance. Neither
the data subject nor the data collector knows or can anticipate with
any certainty what patterns will emerge.84 The newly discovered
regular pattern can be used to predict information about new
potential customers whose behavior has not been tracked in any
database.
The key for the purposes of understanding privacy externalities is
that the regularities and patterns revealed by these techniques apply
82 Zarsky, supra note 17, at 30-32. He uses the phrase "implementation" to describe data
uses. Id. His major theme that privacy regulation should be undertaken at the stage of
usage rather than data collection or analysis is consistent with the unfairness framework
developed here. An alternative typology is found in Nissenbaum, who divides the
information technology landscape into the three parts of (1) tracking and monitoring, (2)
data aggregation and analysis and (3) data dissemination. See Nissenbaum, supra note 55,
at 11.
83See Zarsky, supra note 17, at 27.
84 Id. at 28. Neural network analysis to detect typical spending patterns in credit card
transactions is an example. The card companies do not impose any pattern of spending on
the card holder. Rather they let the pattern itself emerge. Marked departures from the
pattern are then an indication of possible fraudulent use.
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beyond the data used to generate them. Data from people who have
revealed information about themselves through surveys, transactions
and other voluntary disclosures are part of the evidentiary basis for
the knowledge revealed by these analytical techniques. But they apply
to other people who have never disclosed that information about
themselves. Both the underlying evidence and the discovered patterns
are information externalities from the point of view of these people.
These indirect disclosures are usually probabilistic rather than
certain. Most personalization functions at online outlets such as
movie, book or music websites involve privacy externalities. If an
online store knows that two people share most of their book purchases
in common and knows that, in addition, one person likes murder
mysteries by Agatha Christie, it can make the inference with a
reasonable degree of certainty that the other person will like Agatha
Christie novels. The online bookstore's Agatha Christie
recommendations are based on this probabilistic inference.85
Information revealed in the context of eligibility decisions,
through standard scientific research or through data mining will
provide data collectors and users with increasing amounts of
information about data subjects that has been revealed by the
disclosure decisions of others. The dramatically expanded use of data
mining techniques seems likely to be an especially rich source of
indirectly revealed information. This increasingly large pool of
indirectly revealed information can then be used for a variety of
purposes.
Some of these purposes are clearly beneficial on balance. Most
people, for example, like the convenience of recommendations based
on other people's disclosure of their shopping patterns. Those who do
not find them useful are free to ignore them. If there is any harm from
these recommendations, it is easily avoidable and is more than
balanced by the extra information that make shopping more
convenient for other people.
But some of these uses made of indirectly revealed information
will be harmful to data subjects and on balance might be harmful to
society. This leads to the second part of the discussion of negative
privacy externalities-the harmful use of indirectly revealed
information.
85 There is nothing that restricts these inferences to data mining in large and linked data
sets of information about people's online behavior. It is possible whenever information
about one person can be linked through common patterns or structures to information
about other people. For instance, genetic information about one individual in a family can
be inferred from if the genetic structure of a large enough set of relatives is known.
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3. HARMS
In this section, I examine various harms that can occur from the
indirect disclosure of information. These are invidious discrimination,
group injury, inefficient product variety, restricted access to products
and services, and price discrimination.
a. INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION
Information can be used to deny access to employment, insurance,
credit and a variety of other services and benefits based upon
objectionable criteria. For this reason, legal limitations sometimes
prevent people from collecting information thought to be an
inappropriate basis for decision, and decisions based on protected
categories can be called "invidious discrimination." These protected
categories include races, sex, age, and national origin. In an
employment context, for example, a wide range of questions on
employment applications and in job interviews are prohibited or
restricted, covering age, race, religion, national origin, disabilities,
health problems and medical conditions.
One example of a recently added protected category is genetic
information discrimination. Genetic information gathered from some
subjects can demonstrate an association between a racial or ethnic
category and certain genetic dispositions. Once this connection is
made, it can be used to make predictions about all members of the
racial category, not just those who participated in the data collection. 86
Genetic screening can detect susceptibility for certain disorders such
as cancer, Alzheimer's disease and diabetes, and this information
could then be used to deny insurance or employment to people.
One result of this concern about the misuse of genetic information
is a federal law, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
("GINA"), which prohibits U.S. insurance companies and employers
from discriminating on the basis of information derived from genetic
tests.8< Under this new law, insurance companies can reduce coverage
or increase prices based on information about an applicant's genetic
code. Employers cannot take adverse action against employees or
potential employees based on genetic information. Nor can they
require that a person take a genetic test as a condition of obtaining
insurance or employment.
86 Zarsky, supra note 17, at 46.
87 Genefic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 88i.
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Invidious discrimination is illegal, but it might be possible to use
statistical techniques to make connections that make it possible in an
indirect fashion. Some commentators have argued that allowing
eligibility decisions to be made on the basis of statistical information
such as credit card transaction history, criminal histories, online
browsing patterns and the like would have the beneficial result of
blocking direct or indirect invidious discrimination. For example, if an
employer could consult a database of criminal history, then he would
be more comfortable hiring an African American who had no criminal
history. If employers were not allowed to consult such a database, they
would be more likely to fall back on the "old standby" of invidious
racial discrimination.8 8
One response to this has been that the patterns embodied in the
data can themselves be problematic. This can be so in that they simply
reproduce the invidious discrimination. A nationwide pattern of
hiring according to criminal history, for example, would reproduce the
unequal pattern of African American criminal arrest and convictions
records. 89 A more worrisome possibility, however, is that mere
patterns in data might be complex statistical proxies for the suspect
categories of ethnicity, race and religion.
b. GROUP INJURY
In a related way, groups can suffer a harm based upon information
externalities. Consider class rankings. If students are allowed to
disclose their class ranking to admissions officials or employers, the
best students will disclose. Even if other good students try to conceal
the information, the fact that they do not reveal their ranking allows
those making the eligibility decision to infer that they are not in the
top rank. The result for the school will be a drop in the average quality
of their placements. As a result of considerations like this, most
private high schools and over half of public schools no longer report
88 Lior Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination," 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363 (2008)
(arguing that more information about bankruptcies, criminal records, and sex offenses
should be made public as a way to make sure that employers do not use inaccurate
statistical information to profile potential employees and that more accurate information
might hurt the guilty but it will protect the innocent).
89 Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 209. Her additional claim that mere patterns in data
should not be used for eligibility decisions unless supported with "underlying theories of
causation" might prevent useful predictive inferences. It seems that what she is really
getting at is the worry mentioned in the text that the complex patterns detected in data
might simply serve as proxies for the suspect categories of race, religion and ethnicity.
2011] 457
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
student class rankings as part of the college admission process
because they feel it disadvantages those who are left out of the top
rankings.90
There is nothing intrinsically improper about making admission
decisions on the basis of class rankings, but it helps only the very top
students and hurts the rest. A private institution seeking to benefit its
members generally might chose to restrict information flow of this
kind. Fully informed individual choice about whether to reveal class
rankings would allow the top students, rationally, to reveal their top
status, thereby revealing, to their detriment, the lesser ranking of the
remaining students. Similar group harm can result from
investigations into specific racial or ethnic groups. When scientists
were seeking to conduct medical studies of Ashkenazy Jews in the
1990s to determine whether the group's genetic inheritance was
linked to specific diseases, there was concern that the results could be
used to "cast a shadow over the entire ethnic group.",' Individual
consent could be solicited and obtained, but the effects of the studies
would extend beyond the data subjects and apply to the entire group.
Other individuals in this group might experience negative privacy
externalities in the form of invidious discrimination. Individual
consent could not respond to this potential for harm.
It might be appropriate for representatives of the group to be
consulted prior to allowing the study to proceed, rather than seeking
only participants' individual-level consent.92 Ultimately, some of the
harm that such studies could produce, such as discrimination in
employment, was outlawed by the 2008 Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act.
Groups have an interest in the outcome of information revelation
that might be distinct from the interests of the individual members of
the group. This kind of group harm cannot be prevented by fully
informed individual choice, but can be addressed by institutions' or
organizations' action on behalf of the group as a whole.
90 Alan Finder, Schools Avoid Class Ranking, Vexing Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2oo6/o3/o5/education/o5rank.html.
91 SIMPSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21s CENTURY 190
(O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. 2000).
92 This was done in the case of genetic studies on Navajos, for example. See id. at 193.
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C. INEFFICIENT PRODUCT VARIETY
In this section, I discuss how information about consumers can
sometimes be used to change market dynamics in ways that might
harm consumers overall. This can happen when the collection and use
of personal information leads indirectly through a series of
intervening steps to market dysfunctions. One of these dysfunctions is
inefficient product variety. For example, when mass marketing and
production has substantial scale economies and there is little taste for
variety, the introduction of more targeted marketing schemes based
on more detailed information about consumers might reduce overall
welfare. Studies have shown that consumers are aware of and take an
interest in these market effects of information sharing practices. Even
when individuals have the ability to refuse data collection requests, if
enough other people go along with the information collection and use
scheme, the economic damage is done.
Product variety is often thought of as an unmixed blessing.93 But
analysts have isolated cases where there is inefficient product variety.
In such a case, a market starts with the provision of a generic product
like a general interest newspaper whose production and marketing
costs are characterized by substantial scale economies. Then the
market shifts to a market with two products - the old generic product
and a new specialized product such as a pure financial newsletter. The
new product is slightly better for consumers who value only financial
news, but the older generic product becomes more expensive as scale
economies are lost. The welfare gains and losses are ambiguous, since
the new entrant does not compare the gains to the new consumers of
the financial newsletter to the losses of the old consumers of the
generic newspaper. Luc Wathieu describes this situation:
When an entrant uses a fine access system to target a
specific consumer type, scale economies are dismantled
and the remaining consumers suffer from an
externality. This mechanism can lead to these
consumers being excluded, or faced with a high-price
customized offer that constitutes a loss of surplus and
93 Product variety is often considered and defended in the context of price discrimination.
See, e.g., TOM LEONARD & PAUL RUBIN, TECH. POLICY INST., IN DEFENSE OF DATA:
INFORMATION AND THE COSTS OF PRIVACY 31 (2009), available at
http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/in%2odefense%2oof%2odata.pdf.
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signals the end of benefits customarily associated with
mass marketing.94
Privacy is relevant to this dynamic because information about the
preferences of consumers that is voluntarily revealed to marketing
firms is a key element in determining whether the new product should
be introduced. The privacy concern has to do with those who do not
benefit from firms being better informed about the preferences of
different consumer types. They have an interest in not sharing this
kind of information. Even if they understand the situation perfectly
and chose to withhold information so as to frustrate the development
of inefficient product variety, the survey responses or other
disclosures from those who would benefit from the new product would
reveal the necessary information.
The key thing from the point of view of whether consent to sharing
information is sufficient to avoid privacy harms is that it doesn't
matter whether they can foresee this use of information. Assume
perfect understanding of the implications of gathering information for
targeted marketing. Those who would benefit from this change will
reveal the information in the full knowledge that they will benefit.
This allows an adverse implication regarding those who do not reveal
their preferences.
The problem is often viewed as giving people control over the
information that could be used to target them. If they have that
control, and voluntarily give it up, what could go wrong? The
possibility of inefficient product variety shows that something could
still go wrong even when consumers have perfect control over
information about their preferences. Those who would gain from
product variety will reveal information that will help them. Those who
would lose will remain silent, but enough market information is
available to introduce the product even if the losses outweigh the
gains.
One study by Wathieu and Friedman shows that consumers are
sensitive to this possibility that information about them will be used to
change market cost structures in ways that disadvantage them.95 The
specific scenario used to evaluate these indirect privacy concerns had
to do with an affinity marketing program described as follows:
94 Wathieu, supra note 18, at 7.
95 Luc Wathieu & Allan Friedman, An Empirical Approach to Understanding Privacy
Evaluation, (Hary. Bus. Sch., working Paper No. 07-075, 2007) (hereinafter Wathieu &
Friedman), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 982593.
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As a service to its members your college alumni
association has negotiated a special deal with a well-
known car insurance company. The insurance company
will use data (including members' name and contact
information) on a onetime basis to offer alumni (via a
mail and phone marketing campaign) an alumni
association endorsed deal featuring first-class service
levels and a 30% discount on annual insurance
premiums. Based on certain parameters specified by
the insurance company, data for 20% of the alumni
have been transmitted to the insurance company and
all of these alumni are about to be offered the deal. At
this point it is still unknown whether you are among
the beneficiaries of this deal.96
The indirect privacy concern associated with this scenario is that rates
for ordinary drivers could go up if insurance companies find
increasingly effective ways to target safe drivers. Two thirds of the
experimental subjects were somewhat concerned about this
arrangement. Most of them wanted the arrangement reviewed and
approved or rejected by the Board of Alumni and 53% of the
respondents would vote to reject this deal themselves. In an
alternative scenario, respondents are told that they will not get the
deal and their information will not be shared, but this did not produce
a decline in their privacy concern.
Studies like this suggest that consumer concern about privacy
cannot be resolved simply by giving people the chance to opt out of
information sharing arrangements. People seem to understand that
they can be harmed by information sharing arrangements even when
they have the ability to refuse to participate in them.
d. RESTRICTED ACCESS
Some commentators have noted that tracking of online behavior
can result in restricted options. Marty Abrams describes the situation
where "a consumer's vision and choices are limited by his or her
digital history and the analytics that make judgments based on that
digital history" as "boxing."97 The idea is that a person's ability to gain
961d. at 3.
97 Martin Abrams, Guest Headnote: Boxing and Concepts of Harm, 4 PRIVACY & DATA SEC.
L. J. 673, 673 and 675 (2009), available at
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access to the full range of goods and services is limited by a service
provider's perception of him as a customer of a certain kind. Only
certain kinds of products, services or media content will be provided
to him. Despite all efforts, he remains trapped by his history.
Sometimes this boxing has to do with credit worthiness and there
is nothing to be done about it. Sometimes it operates to his benefit, as
when he gains miles in a frequent flier program. But when it operates
to restrict access to what is available, it is no longer desirable.
Consumers want at some point to say, as Abrams puts it, "Stop the
personalization. I want to see the whole picture."98 The key is not to
provide extra choice at the point of data collection, but to have further
choice later on that will help to mitigate the harm.
Data profiling can produce this result, even when the data for the
profiling comes from another person. Zarsky outlines an example.
One customer goes to a website, shares personal demographic
information and zip code and buys high-priced, low-quality products.
He is put in the category of customer who should be shown only high-
priced low-quality products. A customer with a similar demographic
and zip code visits the same website and is put in this same category.
He suffers the same restricted access to the website's goods, despite
having purchased nothing and provided the website with only
demographic information and address.99
As Zarsky notes, even if the original visitor is compensated for
sharing information, the damage is to an external third party who had
no connection to the original transaction.oo They fit a pattern created
by analysis of data from others. Regulating the original transaction
which collected the information is not the key to resolving this
problem. It is the use of the information that creates the harm.
e. PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Price discrimination occurs when firms charge different
consumers different prices for access to the same good or service.
Economists distinguish first-, second- and third-degree price
discrimination. In first-degree price discrimination, the firm gathers
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbLs47Details/Fileupload265/2692/BoxingandConcept
s ofHarm Abrams_9.o9.pdf.
98Id
99 Zarsky, supra note 17, at 43.
1oo Id.
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as much information as possible about potential customers in order to
assess demand. They are seeking to determine how valuable the good
or service they sell is to these potential buyers so as to charge them the
highest possible price they are willing to pay. This clearly involves
extensive information gathering and profiling of specific individuals
and is the form of price discrimination that raises the most questions
about privacy harms. In an online context, the information basis for
"dynamic pricing" is often much less extensive than in other contexts.
Retailers often use nothing more than cookies or browser settings to
determine the offers to make to website visitors, ranging from items
such as airline tickets and hotel rooms to books and CDs to
descriptions of credit card terms and conditions. Alert shoppers can
detect dynamic pricing in this context by using different browsers,
deleting cookies and various other techniques such as leaving items in
shopping baskets for several days.i0i
In second-degree price discrimination, the firm does not ascertain
demand by directly gathering information about individual. Instead,
they offer different prices for different versions or different quantities
of the same product. The idea is that these purchasing decisions will
reveal their preferences. The different prices for the different versions
of the same good or service cannot be explained by differences in the
costs involved. Instead, the differences are meant to appeal to
different intensities of demand. Examples are volume discounts that
cannot be attributed to differences in costs, increased prices for first-
class airline tickets, and intertemporal discrimination such as
premium prices for hardcover books released before the paperback
version and for early windows such as first run theatrical releases for
movies. 102 As in first-degree price discrimination, the point is to
extract more revenue from those customers willing to pay more than
an average price. It can be controversial. For example, products that
have certain functions deliberately disabled in order to appeal to less
affluent customers have drawn strong protests. 03 But second-degree
price discrimination raises fewer questions about privacy harm.
In third-degree price discrimination, the seller does not know the
purchasing power of individual buyers, but is able to separate them
101 Anne Lowrey, Consumers Go Online to Get Better Prices, but Web Merchants Have
Their Own Tricks," SLATE, Dec. 6, 2010.
http://www.slate.com/id/2276918/pagenum/all/#p2.
102 William W. Fisher III, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing OfInformation?,
55 UCLA L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2007).
103 I.
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into groups that correspond roughly to their wealth or eagerness.
Classic examples are student and senior discounts.1o4 Some
information about people is needed to engage in third-degree price
discrimination, but it is usually large demographic categories or
market segments. As the segmentation moves toward personalization,
however, this type of price discrimination verges on first-degree.
Price discrimination is not always possible, but can take place only
under certain market conditions. The seller has to have some degree
of market power. Otherwise, the targets of higher prices could simply
go to another supplier who would be willing to charge just the average
market price. That is why price discrimination could occur under
monopoly telecommunications conditions and in railroad networks
with captive shippers. Odlyzko shows that the railroad industry
practiced widespread price discrimination which led to government
regulation of its prices. 05 Second, the seller must have enough
information to put customers into market segments that differ by the
willingness to pay for the good or service. This can be done effectively
only with good information about specific customers or classes of
customers. Third, the seller must be able to control arbitrage. If
customers who pay little for a good or service can resell it to
customers who were assessed as high-price customers, the price
discrimination will be eroded.o 6
Price discrimination can be good or bad from a social welfare
point of view. Price discrimination usually raises the profits of the
firm that can engage in it. But it can be inefficient. It can reduce
overall social welfare. Compared to a situation of a uniform market
price, the gains to those receiving a lower discriminatory price might
be less than the losses to those who pay a higher price or forego
consuming the good altogether. This can happen for example when
there are very few people in the group that gains, and a substantial
number in the group that loses. Alternatively, it could happen if the
groups are of similar size, but the gains to those in the winning group
are small while the harm to the losing group is substantial.o7
104Id. at 7.
105 Andrew Odlyzko, Privacy, Economics, and Price Discrimination on the Internet, ICEC
2003: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
355-66 (Norman Sadeh, ed., ACM 2003), available at
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/privacy.economics.pdf.
106 Fisher, supra note 103, at 6-7.
107 Id. at 22.
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Law and policy vary substantially in the approach taken to price
discrimination, as befits the indeterminacy of its social welfare
implications. There is no good guide for policymakers as a general
matter. As Fisher sums it up:
[P]rice discrimination is good in some setting and bad
in others. Somewhat more specifically, the merits of the
practice are affected by myriad variables, including the
shape of the submarkets that it permits separating, the
character of the criteria used to divide those groups, its
transparency, and public attitudes toward specific
forms of the practice.os
Price discrimination is unpopular. Consumer reaction to Amazon's
attempt to use information about repeat customers to charge them a
higher price, thereby punishing loyalty, was so uniformly negative that
the practice was abandoned.o9
In a survey of public attitudes, Turow and his colleagues found
that people "overwhelmingly object to most forms of behavioral
targeting and all forms of price discrimination as ethically wrong."11o
The study found that:
* 76% agree that "it would bother me to learn that
other people pay less than I do for the same
products.","
* 64% agree that "it would bother me to learn that
other people get better discount coupons than I
do for the same products."112
1os Id. at 37.
1o David Streitfeld, On the Web, Price Tags Blur; What You Pay Could Depend on Who
You Are,"WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2000, at Aol.
11oJoseph Turow et al., Open to Exploitation: American Shoppers Online and Offline 4
(Annenberg Sch. of Commc'ns, Departmental Papers, June 2005), available at
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/InformationAnd Society/Tur
ow APPCReportWEBFINAL.pdf.
112 Id.
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* 66% disagree that "it's OK with me if the
supermarket I shop at keeps detailed records of
my buying behavior."n3
* 87% disagree that "it's OK if an online store I
use charges people different prices for the same
products during the same hour."114
* 72% disagree that "if a store I shop at frequently
charges me lower prices than it charges other
people because it wants to keep me as a
customer more than it wants to keep them,
that's OK."ns
Part of the reason for its unpopularity is the sense that the
bargaining situation has been altered in an unfair way. As many have
noted, information in the hands of the powerful is a more effective
tool than in the hands of the weak.116 The information used to price
discriminate is not symmetric. The seller knows more about the buyer
than the buyer knows about the seller. As Marc Rottenberg notes, this
asymmetry can exacerbate differences in bargaining power: "In
bargaining, no one wants to give up their 'reservation' price to the
other side. With profiling, the consumers give up the privacy of their
reservation price, but the seller doesn't. So it changes the power in the
bargaining, against consumers.""7
For our purposes, the key question is whether price discrimination
involves privacy harms. Here the consensus of commentators seems
clear:
113 d.
1141d.
us5 Id.
116 Nissenbaum, supra note 55, at 211.
117 Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What
Larry Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 110, available at
http://str.stanford.edu/pdf/rotenberg-fair-info-pracices.pdf.
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* "Policymakers could consider whether price
discriminating firms are violating consumers
privacy interests."" 8
* "[P]rice discrimination is bad if it fosters
invasions of privacy.119
* "Privacy intrusions serve to provide the
information that allows sellers to determine
buyers' willingness to pay." 120
The concern can be described in more detail as follows:
This is an especially serious worry with respect to first-
degree price discrimination. In order to charge each
customer close to the maximum amount that he or she
would be willing and able to spend, sellers need to
know a good deal about individual buyers. Useful
information includes their incomes, wealth, tastes,
purchasing habits, and credit histories. The value of
that information to discriminating sellers may induce
them to create and then exploit channels for gathering
and then aggregating data about their potential
customers. That, in turn, may exacerbate the extent to
which the information technology revolution is already
encroaching upon traditional conceptions of privacy.121
But this description of the privacy harm is entirely circular. The
gathering and aggregating of data about potential customers violates
privacy rights, goes the argument, because it leads to price
118 Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against Consumer Equality in the
Information Age, 1o LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 593 (2oo6), available at
http://egacy.Iclark.edu/org/1clr/objects/LCB1o_3_Edwards.pdf.
119 Fisher, supra note, 102, at 36.
120 Andrew Odlyzko, Privacy, Economics, and Price Discrimination on the Internet, ICEC
2003: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
355 (Norman Sadeh, ed., ACM 2003), available at
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/-odlyzko/doc/privacy.economics.pdf.
121 Fisher, supra note 102, at 36-37.
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discrimination, which for the sake of the argument is assumed to be
injurious. But then the argument turns on its tail and declares that
price discrimination is injurious because it rests on the privacy harm
of gathering and aggregating data about potential customers.
It is important to be clear about what the cause is and what the
effect is in the privacy harm connected to price discrimination. The
harm in this case is the price discrimination that results in a net loss
of social welfare. As we have seen, it is sometimes hard to determine
when a price discriminatory practice is harmful. Economic theory is
not a reliable guide in this area. But even if the information gathered
for the discriminatory pricing has been gathered with full notice and
consent, the harm can occur. As we have seen in other cases,
information gathering and analytic techniques can produce
information about one set of data subjects that is derived from
another set. Informed consent cannot protect against this kind of
information leakage. When there is a privacy harm resulting from
price discrimination, it can be an external harm created by the leaky
character of information.
III. THE UNFAIRNESS MODEL FOR PRIVACY POLICY
A. MOVING BEYOND INFORMED CONSENT
These examples of invidious discrimination, group harm,
inefficient product variety, access restrictions, and price
discrimination mean that when information leaks there can be
negative privacy externalities. They suggest that something other than
disclosure is needed as the centerpiece of privacy policy. Policymakers
need to evaluate directly the outcomes of information use, and not
focus solely on creating an ideal information collection process. This is
not to say that rules for information collection are unimportant. But in
order to device an adequate information collection process,
policymakers will have to evaluate information use. 12 2
Two examples illustrate this extra dimension. Consider
information security. People do not ask merchants to tell them what
level of security they provide when transfer personal information for a
transaction. They simply expect it to be kept safe and secure. They do
not want to control the information. They do not want to know what
they do to keep it secure. They just want the data collector, and those
122 See Zarsky, supra note 17, at 32 ("Solutions should protect the public from dangerous
uses, not from mere surveillance.").
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to whom he passes it on, to protect it. If they fail to keep it safe and
secure, people expect that this unfairness will be remedied by
government, or that they will have recourse to legal proceedings to
hold those responsible to account. While people certainly expect to be
notified if a security breach involving their personal information has
exposed them to the risk of harm, disclosure of security precautions
before the fact is simply irrelevant. People do not shop based on
"security" ratings anymore than they travel on bridges based on
whether that have a small, medium or large risk of collapse. Finally
people do not think that those who have failed to protect the
information entrusted to them to escape all legal liability on the
grounds that they really had not promised to protect the information.
The second example is consumer financial protection. For years,
federal financial regulators implemented the statutory prohibition on
unfair and deceptive acts and practices through disclosure
requirements. As long as the terms of a financial product were clearly
and conspicuously disclosed to consumers, the product itself could be
anything at all. The recent financial meltdown has revealed the
shortcomings of this disclosure approach. The Congress and the
federal regulators reversed course in 2008 and 2009 by banning some
credit card practices. Issuers are no longer able, for example, to apply
new interest rate changes to old credit card balances - even if they tell
consumers in advance. As discussed below, the practice itself is so
unfair that no amount of disclosure could render it legitimate.
Privacy policy needs to supplement informed consent with that
kind of thinking. Some uses of information are damaging to
consumers, they are hard for consumers to avoid on their own and
they have no offsetting benefits. Unfair information practices of this
kind should be prohibited, not simply disclosed. Examples might the
use of medical information or information about sexual preferences to
target advertisements to vulnerable people; the use of information to
commit fraud or to engage in invidious discrimination; posting social
security numbers or other access identifiers online; tracking
everything people read or everywhere web users go on line and
keeping these files forever when they can be subpoenaed in civil
litigation or sold to the highest bidder.
This focus on prohibiting practices might seem extreme. Why
should any uses of information be impermissible? But the opposite
conclusion has already been reached in the past. That is, policymakers
have concluded that certain uses of information are so important the
individual choice simply cannot be allowed. People are not given the
right to opt out of collection of information by credit bureaus because
to do so would be to defeat the purpose - those with bad credit history
would opt out and there would be no good information on bad credit
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risks. Under existing financial privacy rules, people cannot restrict the
use of information about them for fraud prevention purposes. The
idea that some uses of information are so unfair that they should be
restricted is just the other side of the coin of the idea that some uses of
information are so beneficial that individual choice cannot block
them.
1. FINANCIAL CONSUMER PROTECTION
In May 2008, various banking agencies proposed rules addressing
certain unreasonable practices in connection with consumer credit
card accounts and overdraft services for deposit accounts.12 3 Before
the rules could come into effect, however, Congress intervened and
codified many of them in the Credit Card Accountability
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009.124
The rules represented a dramatic change from the traditional way
of regulating unfair actions in the financial service industry. Prior to
these decisions, the banking agencies required substantial disclosure
as a preventive remedy against unfair actions. If consumers were fully
informed of the terms and conditions of a credit or debit card product,
then they could take steps to protect themselves by refusing to do
business with companies whose financial products were too
expensive, too hard to understand, or too tilted toward the interests of
the financial service company.
One of the banned practices was universal default. Under this
practice, a credit card company raises a consumer's interest rate if the
consumer makes a late payment on an account with a different
creditor, such as a cable company or a cell phone company. The harm
was the retroactive application of a higher interest rate to an existing
balance. Information from other creditors could be used to increase
rates on future balances, but not on existing balances.
The banking agencies were very clear that disclosure would not be
enough:
The Agencies are concerned that disclosure alone may
be insufficient protect consumers from the harm
caused by the application of increased rates to pre-
existing balances. Accordingly, the Agencies are
123 Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,904, (May 19, 2008).
12 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility & Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24,
123 Stat. 1734.
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proposing to prohibit this practice except in certain
limited circumstances. 125
Another practice that was banned was double cycle billing. This
occurs when the finance charge on an outstanding balance is
computed based on balances in earlier billing cycles, not just on the
balances in the most recent billing cycle. This practice was so counter-
intuitive and hard to understand that the agencies found that no
amount of explanation or disclosure could render it fair.126
2. REASONABLE INFORMATION SECURITY
In 2005, the Federal Trade Commission began to charge
companies with acting unfairly by failing to provide reasonable
security. In the case it filed and settled against BJ's Wholesale Club
("BJ's"), the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") listed the practices
that did not provide reasonable security, including:
* Failed to encrypt consumer information when it
was transmitted or stored on computers in BJ's
stores;
* Created unnecessary risks to the information by
storing it for up to 3o days, in
violation of bank security rules, even when it no
longer needed the information;
* Stored the information in files that could be
accessed using commonly known default user
IDs and passwords;
* Failed to use readily available security measures
to prevent unauthorized wireless connections to
its networks; and
12573 Fed. Reg. 28,904, at 28,917.
126 Id. at 28,939.
2011]1 471
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
* Failed to use measures sufficient to detect
unauthorized access to the networks or to
conduct security investigations.127
The specificity of these practices relates to the use by the FTC of an
industry standard, the Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard, as a guide to best practices in the industry.128 The claim was
that these practices taken together amounted to a failure to take
reasonable precautions to keep cardholder information safe and
secure. As a result of this failure, issuing banks suffered financial
losses from fraud, card reissuance, and monitoring and notification
costs. Cardholders suffered inconvenience, worry and time loss
dealing with cards that needed to be replaced. Claims against BJ's
have amounted to $13 million. The settlement required BJ's to
implement a comprehensive information security program and obtain
audits by an independent third-party security professional every other
year for 20 years.
By 2008, the FTC had taken actions against twenty companies for
failure to practice reasonable security.129 In one of the most recent
cases involving TJX, among the problems the FIC noted were:
* storing and transmitting personal information
in clear text;
* failing to use readily available security measures
to prevent unauthorized access to its in-store
wireless networks;
127 See Press Release, FTC, BJ's Wholesale Club Settles FTC Charges (June 16, 2005),
available at www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/o6/bjswholesale.shtm.
128 See Data Security Standards Overview, Payment Card Indus. Sec. Standards Council,
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security standards/pci-dss.shtml (last visited Mar.
22, 2011). For a discussion of the use of the PCI standard in FTC reasonable security cases,
see Mark MacCarthy, Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard, in PROSKAUER ON
PRJVACY (2009).
129 The latest involved TJX. See Press Release, FTC, Agency Announces Settlement of
Separate Actions Against Retailer TJX, and Data Brokers Reed Elsevier and Seisint for
Failing to Provide Adequate Security for Consumers' Data (Mar. 27, 20o8), (hereinafter
TJX Release) available at www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/03/datasec.shtm. Other similar cases
the FTC has settled include in addition to BJ's and TJX include DSW, and CSSI. See FTC
Press Release, Card Systems Solutions Settles FTC Charges (Feb. 23, 2006); Press Release,
FTC, DSW Inc. Settles FTC Charges (Dec. 1, 2005).
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* not requiring the use of strong passwords or
different passwords to access different
programs, computers, and networks;
* failing to use readily available security measures
such as a firewall to limit Internet access to its
computers; and
* not employing sufficient measures to detect and
prevent unauthorized access, including failing
to update anti-virus software, and not following
up on security warnings and intrusion alerts.130
These violations of reasonable security also related to the PCI data
security standard. The settlement required TJX to establish and
document a comprehensive information security program and obtain
an audit every two years for the next 20 years.131
In each of these cases the agency found that specific practices were
unreasonable and ordered that they be stopped and replaced with a
reasonable set of information security practices based on a widely
accepted industry standard. The remedy for the unreasonable actions
was not a notification requirement.132 The company was not required
to inform its customers of the detailed steps it was taking to secure the
cardholder information against unauthorized use. It was not required
to obtain consent from them that they accepted the information
security practices put in place. Instead, the agency simply mandated
that the company stop the bad practices and begin the good ones.
130 See TJX Release, supra note 130.
131 Id.
132 Data breach notification legislation is an entirely different response to the data security
problem. They require notification both to allow potential victims to take action to protect
themselves and to induce companies to protect information so as to avoid adverse
publicity. As of April 12, 2010, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands have enacted legislation requiring notification of security breaches. See
the list maintained by the National Conference of State Legislators at
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsnformationTechnology/Securit
yBreachNotificationLaws/tabid/13489/Default.aspx.
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B. THE UNFAIRNESS FRAMEWORK
Instead of a framework that relies on notice and choice alone, the
unfairness framework creates several categories of information
collection and use and varies the regulatory response depending on
the category. At one extreme lie those practices involving the
collection and use of information that are impermissible even with
data subject choice. Call them harmful or impermissible uses of
information. At the other extreme stand those practices involving the
collection and use of information that are so important that they
should be allowed even without data subject choice. Call them public
benefit uses. In between lies the realm of choice.
One way to measure the value of the information use is expected
social utility, defined as the net social gain or loss discounted by the
probability of it occurring. This way of thinking about benefits and
harms obviously fits most closely with the economic framework of
cost-benefit analysis, which normally involves a quantitative
comparison of costs and benefits. But quantification and
measurement have to be relative to the type of benefit and harm
involved. In many cases, the type of harm involved such as an affront
to human dignity or the benefit to human welfare derived from an
increase in autonomy and opportunity will be real effects of an
information practice that are not amenable to expression in
quantitative terms. A qualitative assessment might be all that is
possible in many cases.133
The focus is social, not individual. The fact that some individuals
or groups of individuals benefit or are harmed by an information
practice does not automatically mean that it is a social gain or a social
loss. The perspective is on what is on balance good for society as a
whole. Equity gains or losses have to be taken into account as well to
the extent that policymakers reach the judgment that harms or gains
to specific groups are worthy of special consideration
Finally, the perspective has to be probabilistic. Existing
information practices can be evaluated in part by their actual
consequences. But even then an assessment has to be made of the
likely evolution of the information practice in the future and how an
industry might adjust to any perceived harms. New innovative uses of
information have no track record and so the assessment would have to
be based on the likely results of adding the new practice to the existing
'33 See Ohm, supra note 16, at 29 ("Before enacting any privacy law, lawmakers should
weigh the benefits of unfettered information flow against its costs and must calibrate new
laws to impose burdens only when they outweigh the harms the laws help avoid.").
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mix of information practices and contexts. The level of uncertainty in
these evaluations has to be taken into account when considering any
regulatory regime.
The unfairness regime does not ignore the role of informed
consent. But it treats informed consent as one regulatory tool among
others. Within the unfairness framework, the first step is the provision
of information so that consent can be informed. Providing
information to consumers can be done in one of two ways: disclosure
and notification. Disclosure is the public acknowledgement of an
information collection and use practice.134 Notification is the provision
of this information to a specific individual.135
Notice and opt-out would be an appropriate policy response when
the information practice in question is closer to the public benefit use.
Notice and opt-in would be the appropriate policy when the
information practice is riskier, closer to the harmful uses. Easy opt-in
choice is especially problematic when an information practice has
substantial external information effects that spread the harmful
effects beyond those who have chosen to participate in it.
1. PUBLIC BENEFIT USE
Sometimes the use of information is so important to the public
that choice should not be permitted. In a recent case, the Center for
Disease Control ("CDC") used information from shopper loyalty card
to track down the source of a salmonella outbreak. The supermarkets
involved gave the information to health officials for data mining only
after the shoppers provided their consent.136 But what if there was no
opportunity for consent? Would the supermarkets have been justified
in providing the information in any case? Would CDC have been
justified in demanding it? The perspective of net social utility would
suggest that the answer might very well have been yes.
134 Disclosure can be accomplished by a public description of the information collected and
how it is used. Privacy policies posted on an internet site are one example. They are made
available to all and apply equally to all.
135 Individualized notice is the transmission to customers of detailed information about a
company's collection and use of information. Each customer must receive a separate
notification. GLBA financial privacy notices are examples as are the individual notices
sometimes required under data breach notification laws. Individually transmitted credit
card disclosures are a third.
136 David Mercer, CDC Uses Shopper-Card Data to Trace Salmonella, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 10, 2010,
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9EC5QUGo.htm.
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Cases like this are not hard to find.137 Public health emergencies or
the demands of scientific or medical research sometimes make choice
less attractive. In most cases, public disclosure of the data use would
be required, although not necessarily individualized notification to the
data subjects. To the extent that opting out of these public benefit uses
destroys the effectiveness of the use there is a case for limiting choice.
The detailed discussion of these situations is beyond the scope of
this article. Two general conditions seem to call for limitations on
informed consent in the context of public benefit uses. One is when
getting consent is so expensive that it would render a particular use
uneconomic and this use is socially beneficial. This applies especially
to opt-in consent, where the data user would need to obtain
affirmative consent before proceeding with the information use.
Another is when the major value of the information is its
completeness. In these circumstances, allowing individuals to opt out
of the use would prevent the use altogether or substantial limit its
benefits.
One example of this is the use of information for eligibility
decisions. In the United States, credit bureaus are able to compile full
files on individuals, containing negative information about defaults
and other non-payment, as well as positive information about their
history of successful repayment. These organizations are able to
combine information from large numbers of creditors, who furnish
repayment information, and perform sophisticated analytics on the
data to predict credit and other risk. These systems have substantial
advantages compared to a situation in which each individual creditor
has to rely solely on its own information about credit risk and
compared to situations in which only negative information is
furnished to credit bureaus.138
The successful implementation of this system of full file reporting
does not allow for consumer choice. Consumers provide information
to creditors in the context of the repayment of loans. These creditors
then furnish this information to credit reporting agencies without
providing consumers with any opportunity to opt out of this reporting.
This is necessary for two reasons. First, it is needed to avoid adverse
'37Amitai Etzioni documents many of them ranging from trade-offs of privacy versus
security to limitations on choice in the context of medical research and public health. See
generally AMITAI ETzIoNI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999).
138 See John Barron & Michael Staten, The Value of Comprehensive Credit Reports:
Lessons from the U.S. Experience (aooo) (unpublished manuscript) available at
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/staten.pdf.
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selection.139 If consumers could opt out, then only those with good
repayment histories would allow their creditors to furnish the
information to credit bureaus for aggregation and analysis. Creditors
using credit bureaus for risk analysis would have good information
only on good credit risks. Second, assuming that those who refused to
supply information were all equally bad credit risks is not a
sufficiently granular response. Some of those who would not allow
credit reporting are more worthy of credit than others, but the system
would not generate enough usable information about these
individuals to distinguish them from others less worthy of credit.
Creditors would most likely react to the absence of information about
people who refused to furnish it by simply credit to all of them, even
though many of them were in fact credit worthy.
Granting a choice to individuals to control the flow of information
out of credit bureaus does not suffer from this difficulty. Many states
(forty-seven and the District of Columbia) have reacted to the increase
in reported identity theft by passing laws that allow people to put a
freeze on their credit report.140 The idea is that a creditor will not be
able to obtain a credit report without getting affirmative permission
from the data subject. Identity thieves will have a harder time opening
an account in a victim's name if creditors such as credit card
companies have to contact the victim first before opening the account.
This does not affect the reporting of information into the file; instead,
it imposes important protections on the provision of a file to a
potential creditor.
The lack of individual choice in this area does not mean a lack of
consumer protections.141 The analysis of information compiled in the
credit reports is not restricted, but the use of the information and
analysis is. Permissible purposes are limited to credit, employment,
and insurance. Use for other activities such as marketing is not
permitted. Data subjects have transparency rights, including the right
to access and correct the file and to receive a free copy of it each year.
There is accountability in the use of the information through the
mechanism of an adverse notice whenever an action is taken to deny
139 Beales & Muris, supra note 37, at 116-17.
140 See Consumers Union's Guide to Security Freeze Protection,
http://www.consumersunion.org/campaigns/leam more/oo3484indiv.html (last visited
Mar. 22, 2011) (listing states that have passed credit report freeze laws).
141 Fair Credit Reporting Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2oo6).
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credit or employment to a person based on the information in the
file.142
The balance between publicly beneficial use of consumer
information and consumer protection is often a matter of dispute and
it can and should be adjusted from time to time. For our purposes, the
point is that the FCRA is an example of how to regulate a publicly
beneficial use of information without the mechanism of individual
choice, but with consumer protections.
2. THE REALM OF CHOICE
Many discussions of privacy choice seem to assume that there is a
binary choice between opt-in and opt-out. In fact there is a continuum
of choice regimes. There are several different kinds of disclosure,
notice and choice regimes that make it more or less likely that people
will engage in an information practice. At the one extreme,
policymakers could require individualized notice, a default of no use
of information and a difficult or costly opt-in process. This policy
choice is a "nudge" to consumers not to engage in the practice.143 At
the other extreme, policymakers could allow a more relaxed notice
and choice regime for an information practice that nudges people into
accepting it. Notice requirements might be restricted to generalized
disclosure of the information practice, rather than individualized
notifications. Firms and institutions would be allowed to engage in it
unless told to stop by the data subjects themselves, and there might be
no obligation to spend resources to make opt-out mechanisms easy or
convenient for consumers. In between, there are various ways to
structure a disclosure, notice and choice regime. Table 1 presents one
illustrative example of how such a range of options might be
structured.
How should policymakers determine what kind of choice
framework to provide for an information practice? In the unfairness
142 This requirement was recently updated through the issuance of a final rule requiring
notice for risk-based pricing decisions derived from credit reports. See Press Release, FTC
& Fed. Reserve Bd., Agencies Issue Final Rules on Risk-Based Pricing Notices (Dec. 22,
2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/12/rbpricing.shtm.
143 See RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2009) for a discussion of the use of
policy defaults as a way to provide an incentive to individuals to move in a direction that
best satisfies their long-term interests. See also Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein,
Libertarian Paternalism Is NotAn Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. R. 1159 (2003) for arguments
in favor of setting default rules provide incentives for certain behaviors rather than
imposing binding prohibitions or mandates.
478 [Vol. 6:3
MACCARTHY
framework, there is an interaction between the evaluation of the
information practice and the kind of disclosure, notice and choice
involved. One way to apply the framework, for example, would be to
require individualized notice, a default of no use of information and a
difficult or costly opt-in process when the dangers associated with an
information use are high. While the information burdens associated
with determining the dangers associated with an information practice
are high, they are not insuperable. Agencies or legislatures make
difficult judgments based on the assessment of probable harm in a
wide range of cases from environmental harm to antitrust cases. The
mechanism of determination would have to include some qualitative
assessment of costs and benefits.
The dangers associated with an information practice would
include the extent to which information externalities were present. A
default of information use opt in is especially problematic when
information externalities are present and the practice is likely to be
harmful. In these cases, people cannot protect themselves from harm
by refusing to disclose. If enough other people disclose, the harm is
done. In these cases, it would be even more important for
policymakers to make it difficult for people to engage in the practice
by imposing a rigorous choice requirement, because their decision to
engage in it has external negative effects on other people.
The default setting that the information practice in question can
only take place with the affirmative express consent of the data subject
is appropriate when policymakers want to nudge consumers in the
direction of not furnishing information for that purpose. Firms and
other institutions that want to engage this practice are not forbidden
to do so, but they must first provide an adequate description of what
the information practice involves and obtain consent from the data
subjects. The process itself of providing the information to potential
consumers is often expensive and can itself act as a barrier to the
economic provision of the service. And given fact that people rarely
change defaults, it is likely that few people will chose to use the
service.
In contrast, when information use is reasonably likely to produce
pubic benefits, the notice and choice regime needs to nudge people
into accepting it. Notice requirements might be restricted to
generalized disclosure of the information practice, and firms and
institutions would be allowed to engage in it unless told to stop by the
data subjects themselves. The opt-out mechanisms might not have to
be easy or convenient for consumers. The idea would be that only
consumers who were very concerned about the practice and willing to
go to substantial lengths to opt out of it would take the trouble to take
advantage of the opt-out opportunity. When negative information
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externalities are small or positive, policymakers can be even more
confident that an opt-out is the right policy choice.
An attempt can be made to avoid an assessment of the social value
of an information practice by talking instead about the type of
information involved. If information is "sensitive" then consumers
have to be given a greater degree of control. But this inevitably creates
overly broad rules such as a rule requiring affirmative express
permission for all uses of financial information. To remedy this defect
of over breadth, a series of exceptions from the rule can be crafted,
such as for operational or fraud uses.144 But a list of exceptions cannot
be flexible enough to cover the possible information uses that might
provide significant benefits. The result is that as a practical matter the
opt-in rule for information uses involving financial information or for
"sensitive" information generally acts as a barrier to innovation in that
area.
To ensure that information is usable for consent, the FTC can use
its authority to prevent deceptive practices. For example, the activities
of Sears were the subject of an FTC enforcement action under its
deception authority. In this case, the FTC ruled that disclosure was
inadequate, and it required an affirmative opt-in for the kind of data
collection the company was contemplating. The disclosure had to be
clear and conspicuous and presented at the time when the
information would be useful for decisionmaking, not buried in the
details of an unread privacy policy.145 There is some indication that the
FTC will increasingly use its deception authority to regulate the
quality of disclosure and choice provided.146
3. IMPERMISSIBLE USES
A wide variety of harms can be considered in this category. The
very general concept involved is that there are uses of information,
144 This is the approach taken by the draft Boucher bill and suggested by the FTC draft
principles.
145 Complaint for FTC, In the Matter of Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., No. C-4264 (F.T.C.
2oog), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o823099/o9o6O4searscmpt.pdf.
146 See the recent statement from FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz. "You can't take away
consumer rights by burying them in the fine print," Leibowitz said. "That would be an
unfair or deceptive act or practice under the FTC's bread-and-butter statute and a violation
of the FTC act." Bob Herbert, FTC Privacy Review Could Mean Trouble for Online
Marketing, ADVER. AGE, Apr. 19, 2010, available at
http://adage.com/columns/article?article id=143343.
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which, on balance, are so harmful for society that they are not allowed.
This general concept does not specify in particular cases which harms
fall into that category, nor does it describe a procedure for
determining what falls in that category. The preceding sections
discussed possible harms involving invidious discrimination,
inefficient product introduction and price discrimination, without
making a judgment about whether they are so harmful that they
should be restricted. But the discussion indicates that at least some
information practices are harmful.147
Much harm is tangible and measurable. Loss of life and limb are
measurable harm. Loss of property and monetary damages are
tangible. The loss of employment, credit or insurance is a measurable
harm. The increased price for credit derived from risk-based pricing is
a tangible harm.148 The loss of reputation is a tangible harm that can
sometimes be measured. Businesses interested in preserving their
brand take concrete and practical steps to avoid or minimize
reputational risk. The damage to credit worthiness from identity theft
is a measurable harm, as is the time and inconvenience needed to
restore the perception of credit worthiness.
Harm can be probabilistic. Extra risk of harm is also a harm.
Increased risk of death or physical assault represents a loss of well-
being. The increased risk of identity theft is a measurable harm.
Greater exposure to the loss of property and monetary damage are
tangible harms. Courts do not usually find harm in tort cases involving
147 See Ohm, supra note 16, at 57 ("When the costs significantly outweigh the benefits of
information flow, regulators might ban completely the dissemination or storage of the
particularly type of information."). I follow Zarsky on this and put the control at the level of
use rather than at the level of storage. It is possible, however, that the inherent risk in
harmful use of information from collecting, aggregating and storing information might be
so great that a ban is appropriate. See Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, in
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 105 (2oo8) ("The collection of this information itself can
constitute a harmful activity....").
148 Risk-based pricing refers to the practice of setting or adjusting the price and other terms
of credit provided to a particular consumer based on the consumer's creditworthiness.
Pursuant to the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, the FTC and federal
banking regulators require a creditor to provide a consumer with a notice when, based on
the consumer's credit report, the creditor provides credit to the consumer on less favorable
terms than it provides to other consumers. Prior to the 2003 revision of FCRA, this action
did not count as an adverse action requiring notice. See Press Release, FTC & Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Agencies Issue Final Rules on Risk-Based Pricing
Notices, Dec. 22, 2009, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2oo9/12/rbpricing.shtm. The
fact that the practice requires an "adverse action" notice reveals that it counts as a
quantifiable harm to the consumer involved, even if on balance this business practice does
more good than harm.
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privacy violations when there is no actual harm.149 But a regulatory or
legislative approach is not subject to this restriction. Indeed, the move
from the tort framework for remedying privacy violations to the
legislative fair information privacy principles framework represented
an attempt to account for the risk of harms.15o
It is important to specify that harms need not be tangible or
quantifiable. Some real harms are hard to quantify. This is the case for
the harm of intrusion when telemarketers interrupt normal activities
with unwanted telephone solicitations. The insult to dignity
experienced when someone examines a data subject's medical or
financial records for no good reason except curiosity is also a real but
intangible privacy harm. In general violations of people's reasonable
expectations of privacy are genuine, but hard to quantify harms.
It might be reasonable to try to operationalize the real but
intangible harm created by mere disclosure of information as the
increased risk of a broad, but indeterminate class of more tangible
economic harms. If information about the web browsing habits of
large numbers of people is generally available to data analysts working
for companies seeking commercial advantage, these data subjects
might feel exposed and at risk. They might not know exactly what
could go wrong, but they have a sense that one or more uses of this
data might cause them tangible harm. They might conceptualize this
as an insult to dignity, or a restriction on autonomy. At the same time,
associated with this intangible affront to dignity and autonomy is the
real and perhaps significant risk that their web browsing habits might
be used against them. A significant risk of injury is an injury. The
intangibility derives from the lack of knowledge of where the injury
might come from, but with the understanding that damage of some
kind is highly likely.
One standard for determining that a use of information is harmful
is the FTC's unfairness standard, discussed in the next section.
149 See John Barron & Michael Staten, The Value of Comprehensive Credit Reports:
Lessons from the U.S. Experience Summary, (2000) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/staten.pdf.
150 See Ohm, supra note i6, at 28 ("[B]eginning in the 1970s, Congress began to enact
statutes designed to reduce the risk of potential harm.").
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Table 1
Regulation by Expected Social Value of Information Use
Public High Medium Low Low Medium High
Benefit Value Value Value Risk Risk Risk Harmful
Disclosure Sometimes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NA
Individual
Notice
Needed?
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No
Default Use Use Use Open Open No Use Use No Use
Easy Easy
Hard to to Hard
to opt Easy to chang chang Easy to to opt No opts
Choice No opt out out opt out e e optin in in
4. THE UNFAIRNESS STANDARD
Unfairness is a key concept in understanding how people can be
protected from harmful uses of information. There is a substantial
case law on the FTC's use of unfairness that can be brought to bear on
the question of whether specific acts or practices involving the
collection and use of information are unfair. 15 The Congress has
codified a standard for unfairness, defining it as taking place when:
the act or practice causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not
15 The history of the FTC's unfairness authority is controversial, and for years Congress
refused to allow unfairness rulemakings because it did not perceive that the authority was
tightly enough constrained. The establishment of the unfairness standard in statute
restored the FTC's ability to act comprehensively in this area. For further discussion, see J.
Howard Beales III, The FTC's Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and
Resurrection, 22 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 192 (2003). There is significant overlap between
the characteristics that motivate a regulatory approach according to Nehf and the
unfairness standard. Nehf identifies six relevant characteristics: involuntary and
unavoidable risks, difficulty in identifying individual harm, obstacles to tracing injury to its
cause, inadequacy of money damages, externalities, and non-economic value in preventing
the harm. Nehf, supra note 14, at 73-76. The only externality he identifies in the privacy
area however is from identity theft. Id. at 79-8o.
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outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or
to competition.152
The interpretation of this statutory mandate involves the use of a
three part test: (1) Does the act or practice cause substantial injury to
consumers? (2) Can this injury be reasonably avoidable by
consumers? (3) Are there countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition? This three part test is essentially a reduction of the
concept of unfairness to a cost-benefit test.153
5. SUBSTANTIAL INJURY
The key element is whether the injury is substantial. A substantial
injury cannot be trivial or speculative, but ordinarily consists of
"monetary, economic or other tangible harm."154 Emotional distress,
mental anguish, loss of dignity and other harms are not ruled out by
this criterion, but they must be effects that all or most or reasonable
persons would construe as genuine harms. Thus, a finding that
unsolicited commercial telephone calls at dinner time were intrusive
and caused unjustified emotional harm would not be refuted by
claiming that the harm is purely mental, or by showing that it is not
universally shared because some people like to be interrupted at
dinner. It would be enough to note that most or reasonable people
would find such intrusions a source of annoyance and distress.
The unfairness concept of substantial injury is flexible enough to
accommodate the intangible "dignity" harms that FTC Consumer
Protection Bureau Director David Vladeck's recently described notion
of a more expansive view of harm as a potentially intangible concept
that goes beyond monetary loss to include violations of dignity.55
152 15 U.S.C. 45(n) (2006).
153 Beales & Muris, supra note 37, at 132.
154 May 2008 Proposal at 28,908. See also FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, appended
to In the Matter ofInt'lHarvester Co, 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984). ("In most cases a
substantial injury involves monetary harm. . . Emotional impact and other more subjective
types of harm, on the other hand, will not ordinarily make a practice unfair. Thus, for
example, the Commission will not seek to ban an advertisement merely because it offends
the tastes or social beliefs of some viewers .... ").
155 Stephanie Clifford, Fresh Views at Agency Overseeing Online Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
2oog, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo9/o8/o5/business/media/o5ftc.html
(quofing David VlIadeks, saying "There's a huge dignity interest wrapped up in having
somebody looking at your financial records when they have no business doing that.").
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A substantial injury can be distributed.156 Information uses that
reduce privacy by small amounts for large numbers of people
therefore could count as unfair. The familiar problem that privacy can
be lost in small amounts is covered by this notion: even if the amount
of the privacy harm per person is small the aggregate cost can be very
high.'s?
A substantial injury can be probabilistic.158 If a use of information
creates a substantial risk of harm it is substantial injury. Under FTC
standards, there is no justification for claiming that no harm was done
because the risk of harm did not materialize. A person is worse off if
his chances that he will be injured increase even if the harm never
transpires. Insurance companies, credit granting institutions and
other business enterprises have well-developed ways of quantifying
such risks in financial terms, and incorporating them into their
accounting systems.159
156 Letter from FTC Wendell H. Ford, Senator, & John C. Danforth, Senator, n.12 (Dec. 17.
1980), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm ([hereinafter FTC
Policy Statement] ("An injury may be sufficiently substantial, however, if it does a small
harm to a large number of people ..... ").
57 The unfairness framework thereby responds to the "moral mathematics" concern
articulated by Helen Nissenbaum that each privacy incursion is "a step down the slippery
slope," Nissenbaum supra note 56, at 242, and that some institutional structure must be
found to "stop the slide down the slope and prevent society from throwing away privacy in
tiny bits." Id. at 243.
iss FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, supra note 154, at n. 12 ("An injury may be
sufficiently substantial, however, if... it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.").
159 Some courts have refused to recognize that the increased risk of a privacy harm is a
harm. In Pisciotta v. Old National Bankcorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007) a case involving
identity theft, the court dismissed a suit by a group of people alleging that the disclosure of
their personal information to a hacker had injured them by saying, "(w)ithout more than
allegations of increased risk of future identity theft, the plaintiffs have not suffered a harm
that the law is prepared to remedy." Id. at 639. In a similar way, in Allison v. Aetna, No.
09-2560 (E.D. Pa. 2010), U.S. District Judge Legrome D. Davis dismissed a class action
suit against an insurance company whose database had been hacked, noting, "At best,
plaintiff has alleged a mere possibility of an increased risk of identity theft, which is
insufficient for purposes of standing, and he certainly has not asserted a credible threat of
identity theft." Id. at *51t is not clear whether the courts in these cases are dismissing the
actual increase in risk as irrelevant or noting that the allegation of increased risk is merely
speculative, or asserting that the increased risk is real but not large enough to be
significant or substantial. In any case, the FTC's policy of bringing cases for the increased
risk of identity theft under its unfairness authority demonstrates that they have the ability
to take probabilistic harms into account.
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When the FTC acted to require companies to practice reasonable
security, they were invoking this probabilistic notion of substantial
harm:
(the) failure to employ reasonable and appropriate
security measures to protect personal information and
files caused or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers that is not offset by countervailing benefits
to consumers or competition and is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers. This practice was an unfair act
or practice.16o (emphasis added)
6. AVOIDING HARM
A second element in the unfairness test is whether people have the
ability to protect themselves from the harm through their own actions.
Declining to participate in the activity is one way to protect oneself.
Sometimes an information practice is harmful, but there are ways to
remedy it that do not involve prohibitions. Supplementing market
mechanisms with government-supplied or required practical,
convenient opt-out choice might be all that is needed. The intrusion
harm from telemarketing calls could be addressed in this way. But if
an industry practice is widespread there might be no practical
alternative. In addition, an unfair feature of a transaction might be so
small an element of it that it cannot reasonably be the basis for
rejecting the transaction as a whole.
The question of whether consumers can reasonably avoid harm is
connected to the notion of privacy externalities we have been
developing. As data analytics become more refined, it will be less
possible for concealment to prevent the harmful use of information. In
more and more circumstances, leaving the decision to share or not to
share information to the individual would not protect other
individuals. If a person declined to disclose the presence or absence of
a particular characteristic, the data collector could still obtain that
io In the Matter of BJ's Wholesale Club Inc., C-4148, at 3 (F.T.C. 2005) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o42316o/o923o5compo42316o.pdf; see also Beales &
Muris, supra note 37, at 133 (asserting that harm need not be restricted to actual harm:
"When intentional theft of information has occurred, the Commission need not prove
actual fraud to prevail in an unfairness case, particularly if the interval between the breach
and its detection is short enough that fraudulent use may not yet be observable.").
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information indirectly. As we have seen, data collectors and analysts
can obtain other information about the data subject either directly or
through publicly available or commercial databases. Using advanced
analytical techniques they can often infer with a reasonable degree of
probability whether the person had the characteristic. Reasonable
efforts by individuals to protect themselves by withholding
information might be useless in the context of ubiquitous data
collection and powerful analytics.
7. COUNTERVAILING BENEFITS
A third element in the unfairness standard is that the harm is not
outweighed by a greater social good. This is essentially a requirement
to do an assessment of the benefits of an information practice as well
as the costs. The key element here is social good. The compensating
benefit need not be distributed to the same individuals who
experience the harm. For example, credit bureau information related
to a person's repayment of debt can be either positive or negative
information. If it is negative, it makes perfect sense for a person to
want to conceal it. But Congress determined that the use of this
information for employment, insurance and credit decisions was on
balance good for society. The interest a person with negative credit
has in concealing the information was outweighed by the advantages
to society as a whole in having accurate information for crucial
eligibility decisions.' 6' The assessment of countervailing benefits has
to be made at the social level.
The role of privacy externalities is relevant here as well. In
examining whether an information practice has net benefits, all the
consequences have to be assessed. This includes positive and negative
consequences and internal (to the data subject) and external (to
others) consequences. If revelation of information by some results in
revelation of information about others, the consequences of this
external effect, positive and negative, have to be considered.162
16iThe social decision to allow credit bureaus was not made under the FTC's unfairness
authority, but directly by Congress. But it illustrates the point that the compensating
benefit has to be social in character. The decision to allow full file credit bureaus is not the
only possible decision. Other countries do not allow credit bureaus or restrict them to
negative information. See Barron & Staten, supra note 149.
162 This could present an administratively complex task imposing substantial information
burdens on an enforcement agency such as the Federal Trade Commission. It is worth
pointing out that environmental protection agencies and other regulatory agencies face
similar requirements to regulate on the basis of assessments of social benefits and
economic feasibility. Indeed, executive branch agencies face a cost-benefit mandate under
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The balancing test of whether the use of information has net
benefits applies to secondary uses as well. The assessment of the
possible benefits of secondary use of information is especially
important. Society as a whole might benefit from some secondary uses
and only balanced, nuanced assessments of the costs and benefits of
types of uses could establish that. The assumption that all secondary
uses of information are harmful is not sustainable. A demand that all
data be destroyed after the initial use is accomplished is effectively a
judgment that all secondary use is harmful. So is a requirement that
data collectors return to the data subjects for affirmative consent
before secondary use. For this reason, part of the European Privacy
Directive is worrisome. 63 By putting an affirmative choice
requirement on all secondary uses, these rules effectively make a
substantive policy decision that these uses are not worthwhile and
should be discouraged.
8. DOES THE FTC HAVE AUTHORITY TO USE UNFAIRNESS IN PRIVACY
CASES?
When the FTC first began to consider privacy on the Internet, it
invoked its deception authority rather than its unfairness authority. In
a 1998 report to Congress it outlined what it perceived to be the limits
of its authority in the privacy area:
The federal government currently has limited authority
over the collection and dissemination of personal data
existing OMB directives. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, 2009 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative-reports/2009_fina
IBCReportol272olo.pdf However, high-level decisions about the value of certain
general information practices would be not be made by regulators alone. They would be
subject to legislative action and substantial public discussion and debate in which all
parties would have a chance to be heard and views considered. This kind of public debate is
what led to restrictions on credit bureaus in Australia, where the decision was directly
imposed by the legislature rather than through regulatory action. See Graham Greenleaf,
Privacy in Australia, in GLOBAL PRIVACY PROTECTION 143-44, (James B. Rule & Graham
Greenleaf eds., 2oo8).
163 European privacy requirements hold that information collected from a data subject
should only be used for the specific purpose for which it was collected. Secondary use is
permitted only with the affirmative consent of the data subject. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex
Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 553, 561, p.53 (1998).
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collected online ...in certain circumstances,
information practices may be inherently deceptive or
unfair, regardless of whether the entity has publicly
adopted any fair information practice policies....
However, as a general matter, the Commission lacks
authority to require firms to adopt information practice
policies.164
The FTC repeated this point two years later in 2000, stating that it
"lacks the authority to require firms to adopt information practice
policies or to abide by the fair information practice principles."165 As a
result of statements like this from the FTC and its practice of only
bringing deception cases in the privacy area, many commentators
concluded that the FTC could not use its unfairness authority to
specify any particular fair information practices or to prohibit
information practices as unfair.166
It is hard to understand the reason behind this. The FTC itself
never explained why it thought it was limited in this way. One
commentator tried to provide a reason:
The FTC's enabling act restricts its powers to situations
where an unfair act or practice "causes or is likely to
cause substantial injury to consumers which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or
to competition...Due to the difficulty in monetizing
many privacy violations and other problems in fulfilling
this jurisdictional calculus, the FTC may face objections
164 FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 41 (1998), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/conclu.shtm.
165 FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE
34, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2ooo/privacy2ooo.pdf
166 DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 73, (2oo4) ("In the end, however, the FTC is
limited in its reach. It only ensures that companies keep their promises."); Fred H. Cate,
The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE
OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 353 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006); Paul Schwartz, Privacy and
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1609, 1638 (1999) ("Web sites that make no
promises about privacy...are likely to fall outside the FTC's jurisdiction."; Fred H. Cate,
"the Commission was relying on its power to prohibit "deceptive" trade practices-i.e.,
practices that did not conform to published privacy policies-rather than its power to
prohibit "unfair" trade practices.").
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should it take an aggressive role in policing information
privacy in cyberspace with no more authorization than
the general grant found in its enabling statute. 67
However, there is no requirement that the substantial injury test
be monetized. As we have seen, it can accommodate real subjective
preferences even if these preferences are not expressed in quantifiable
terms, such as willingness to pay for products bought and sold in the
marketplace.
As previously noted the FTC has taken steps to assert its
unfairness jurisdiction in the area of information security. In the first
case it brought it asserted that "(BJ's) failure to employ reasonable
and appropriate security measures...was an unfair act or practice." 168
The harms in these cases included both monetized harms such as the
financial losses to issuing banks and the less tangible losses of worry,
inconvenience and time lost dealing with the problem. It is a
reasonable extension of that practice to bring the FTC's unfairness
authority to bear on larger privacy problems.
Several parties have explicitly called upon the FTC to exercise its
unfairness authority in the privacy area.
The FTC should also continue to pursue enforcement
actions and provide guidance to industry, but with a
renewed emphasis and focus on a comprehensive set of
Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPs). To do so,
the FTC must reclaim its authority to fully enforce all of
the FIPs under its unfairness jurisdiction. 169
In light of the pressing need to move beyond disclosure, notice and
choice and to evaluate directly the value of information collection and
use practices, it would be important for the FTC to use its unfairness
167 Schwartz, supra note 166, at 1638-39.
168 Complaint at 3, In the Matter of BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., No C-4148(E.D. Pa. Sept 20,
2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o42316O/o923o5compo42316o.pdf.
Each subsequent case invoked the same unfairness authority.
169 Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., Refocusing the FIC's Role in Privacy Protection: Comments
of the Center for Democracy & Technology In regards to the FTC Consumer Privacy
Roundtable 4, (November 6, 2009) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/privacyroundtable/544506-OOO26.pdf.
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authority to examine whether certain types of information practices
are harmful.70
A first step in that direction might be a survey of information uses
in particular areas of concern such as online behavioral advertising,
social networks and location privacy. In order for the public and
policymakers to be able to assess an information practice it needs to
be public. A comprehensive information policy might require an
inventory of current and innovative uses of information. This could be
supplemented with an ongoing survey of the new developments in
information use. This would provide policymakers and the public with
the background knowledge of industry practices they would need.
9. RELATED MODELS
The consequentialist approach recommended by former FTC
officials Howard Beales and Tim Muris has affinities with the
unfairness approach just outlined.'7' According to the consequentialist
approach,
the focus should be on the consequences of information
use and misuse. There is little basis for concern among
most consumers or policymakers about information
sharing per se. There is legitimate concern, however,
that some recipient of the information will use it to
create adverse consequences for the consumer. Those
consequences may involve physical harm, as when
stalkers obtain information about their victims or child
predators seek information online. They may be
economic consequences, as when one's identity is
stolen or when credit or insurance is denied based on
incomplete or inaccurate information. Or there may be
unwanted intrusions, such as the telemarketing call
that disrupts the dinner hour or the spam that clogs
our inboxes.172
170 The FTC's unfairness authority can be used to ban practices, but it can also be used to
impose other remedies such as disclosure.
171 Beales & Muris, supra note 37, at 109.
172 Id. at 118.
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This approach adopts the cost benefit test embodied in the FTC's
unfairness standard. 173 They assert that there is an "absence of a
privacy problem when consumers understand and have a choice about
the information collection and use." In their harms-based approach,
the role of choice is to legitimate an information use practice.
Disclosure and the opportunity to refuse a service are all that is
needed. It is sometimes thought that the harm approach is restricted
to tangible harms, but the Beales and Muris version does not contain
that restriction:
I don't think there is anything in the harm-based
approach to thinking about privacy that says we can
only -- it can only deal with tangible harms. If you think
about the very first case we brought under the
consequences-based approach, it was a case against Eli
Lilly that involved the release of e-mail addresses of
Prozac users. A lot of them.gov addresses. And there's
no tangible economic harm that goes with that as far as
we know or knew or still know. There is a subjective
preference on the part of many people that that kind of
information shouldn't be out there and that, it seems to
me, is what that case is about. Subjective values are
important in a lot of places. They are important guides
to what we do in the economy in products and services
and privacy is no different about that. 174
Beales and Muris apply the consequentialist approach largely to
data security issues. The one example of the consequentialist
approach relating to pure privacy had to do with the intrusions caused
by telemarketing calls. But that decision was made under specific
authority, not under the FTC's general unfairness authority. Beales
and Muris do not extend the consequentialist thinking to other
privacy examples, though the logic of their position leads to it. The
similarities between this consequentialist approach and the unfairness
model are substantial. Both emphasize preventing harmful use. Both
173 "A far better approach to privacy protection is to focus on the consequences of
information use and misuse for consumers. This approach directs attention to the relevant
tradeoffs between benefits and costs of information use." Id. at 135.
174 FTC, EXPLORING PRIVACY: A ROUNDTABLE SERIES (Dec. 7, 2009) (remarks of FTC
Chairman Howard Beales, Panel 5), available at http://htc-
01.media.globix.net/COMPoo876oMOD1/ftcweb/transcripts/1207o9_sess.pdf.
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use a cost-benefit test. Both rely on the FTC's unfairness authority.
Both would restrict choice when there are substantial public benefits
at stake. Both allow for intangible harms. The main difference is that
the Beales and Muris consequentialist approach does not focus on the
need to distinguish opt-in versus opt-out choice, and that it would
allow even harmful uses of information if they had been subject to
individual consent. As we have seen above, the presence of negative
privacy externalities can mean that some information practices are
harmful, even when they meet the criterion of informed consent. The
need to provide additional consumer protections beyond notice and
choice is crucial for robust privacy policy, and is lacking in the Beales
and Muris harms model.
The Business Forum for Consumer Privacy Center has developed a
Use and Obligations privacy framework, which has affinities with the
unfairness approach:
But today, online and in public life, individuals,
organizations and data analytics generate ever-
growing amounts of data that fuel existing and
emerging business processes. Wireless and
mobile communications offer new points of data
collection and provide new kinds of data. Open
networks and the evolution of the Internet as a
commercial medium and as a platform for connected
services enable ubiquitous collection and global flow of
data. Data about an individual can be easily copied and
aggregated across vast, interconnected networks.
That data, enhanced by analytics, yields insights and
inferences about individuals based on data maintained
in multiple databases scattered around the world.
Asking the individual to assume responsibility for
policing the use of data in this environment is no
longer reasonable, nor does it provide a sufficient check
against inappropriate and irresponsible data use in the
marketplace.s75
175 The Bus. Forum for Consumer Privacy, A Use and Obligations Approach to Protecting
Privacy: A Discussion Document 2 (2009),
http://www.huntonfiles.com/files/webupload/CIPL Use_and_Obligations WhitePaper
.pdf.
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This approach focuses on use, not collection of information. It
does not allow choice in certain circumstances including the use of
information for internal business purposes, for fulfillment of services,
for fraud and authentication services, and provides an opt-out for
marketing uses. It recognizes that individual choice is not a sufficient
test for protecting against harmful uses of data. It does not, however,
call for the prohibition of certain data practices and does not embrace
the use of the FTC's unfairness authority.
Daniel Weitzner and colleagues have developed an information
accountability framework.176 A key premise in this approach is that the
"access restriction" perspective that has dominated privacy policy
discussions must give way to an informational accountability and
appropriate use model. The reason for this change is the development
of ubiquitous data collection and growth of information analytics:
In a world where information is ever more easily copied
and aggregated, and where automated correlations and
inferences across multiple databases can uncover
information even when it has not been explicitly
revealed, accountability must become a primary means
by which society addresses issues of appropriate use. 7
They reject the notice and choice model and embrace the idea that
harm prevention and redress should be the goal:
Web users (could have) the ability to make privacy
choices about every single request (for) collection
(of) information about them. However, the number,
frequency and specificity of those choices would be
overwhelming especially if the choices must consider
all possible future uses by the data collector and third
parties. Consumers should not have to agree in advance
to complex policies with unpredictable outcomes.
Instead, they should be confident that there will be
redress if they are harmed by improper use of the
176 See Daniel J. Weitzner, et al., Information Accountability, (Computer Sci. & Artificial
Intelligence Laboratory Technical Report MIT-CSAIL-TR-2007-o34, 2007), available at
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/37600/MIT-CSAIL-TR-2007-o34.pdf.
rn7 Id. ati1.
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information they provide, and otherwise they should
not have to think about this at all.'78
The proposed solution to this situation is the construction tools
that allow users of information to become aware of permissible uses
and to limit their use in accordance with these constraints. While this
framework is a start toward a new approach to privacy, it has not yet
developed the specificity and the regulatory structure needed to be a
replacement or supplement to the notice and choice model.
Fred Cate has proposed several Consumer Privacy Protection
Principles for the regulation of harmful uses of information that is
similar to the unfairness approach outlined here. He distinguishes per
se harmful uses from per se not harmful uses. A per se harmful use
such as the use of personal information to commit fraud is one which
is always harmful. The government should prohibit these uses. Per se
not harmful uses present no reasonable likelihood of harm. The
government should not regulate those uses at all. Consent should be
reserved for "sensitive" uses of information where the use is
"reasonably and objectively thought to be intrusive, offensive, or
otherwise invade personal privacy." The privacy protections should be
subject to a cost-benefit balancing test, and the harms in question are
tangible harms defined as damage to persons or property.179
The similarities are substantial, especially the overall division into
uses that should not be subject to choice, those that cannot be allowed
and those where choice is appropriate. He does not specify which
agency of government would enforce these principles, but they could
be carried out by the FTC using its unfairness authority with its cost
benefit test. So his framework is consistent with the use of the FTC as
an enforcement agency.
Some differences remain. His constraint that the harms have to be
"tangible" harms that damage persons or property seems to be too
narrow. His limitation of choice to those circumstances where there is
a reasonable likelihood of harm seems too strong. The stronger test in
the unfairness model for suspending choice is public benefit, where
choice would prevent publicly beneficial uses. The unfairness model
would allow for choice in substantially more cases. Finally, his model
does not distinguish within the realm of choice between opt-in and
178Id. at 2-3.
179 Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 370 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).
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opt-out corresponding to the relative closeness of an information
practice to pure unfairness or public benefit use.
IV. APPLICATIONS
The framework developed above can be applied to some of the
cases discussed earlier. Invidious discrimination falls into the category
of harmful uses of information. Information to be used for that
purposed cannot be collected, even with individual choice, since
choice allows information unraveling and adverse inference to be
made about other people, thereby exposing them to invidious
discrimination.
Scientific research on the other hand is overall beneficial and so
should be allowed. The exception is the direct manipulation of an
experimental subject that might expose him to significant risks. Here
the IRB process provides for informed consent, supplemented with
IRB review of experimental risks.
Data mining can be used for many purposes and its acceptability
depends on the purpose. When information is used for price
discrimination, access restrictions or inefficient product variety there
is moderate to high risk of social harm. These practices are not per se
harmful, but they create a significant possibility of external harms to
people who cannot avoid the harms by individual consent. In these
circumstances, it makes sense to raise the costs of collecting and
analyzing the information used for these purposes as a way of
controlling these extra risks. Requirements for notice and affirmative
consent might accomplish this.
Use of credit bureau information for eligibility decisions is a social
benefit. Since individual choice makes it impossible or extremely
difficult for society to have this benefit, it makes sense to put these
activities in the public benefit class where the default is that
information will be shared and used for these purposes and no opt-out
is allowed.
A. ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING
Online behavioral advertising involves the tracking of consumers'
online activities in order to deliver tailored advertising. It usually
involves three parties: a content provider who operates a website or
other online service, an ad serving company, and an advertiser who
wants to reach a targeted audience with a message. When a user
arrives at a site, the content provider displays its material and sends a
message to the ad server to fill in space on the site reserved for
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advertising. The information available to the ad server will determine
what ad it provides to fill this space. This information can include
information about the online activities of the visitor at that website,
the activities of the visitor at other websites, personally sent by the
content provider, and information from off-line databases. By
combining this information in various ways, the ad server creates a
profile of the visitor and uses that profile to provide an ad that will be
most relevant to the visitor and most likely to induce him or her to
click on the ad in pursuit of those interests.so
Online behavioral advertising involves the creation of a profile of
the individual based in part upon his online behavior. Websites and ad
serving networks place cookies (small bits of computer code) on
visitors' computers that enable the website to recognize repeat visitors
and tailor the web experience of the user based on prior visits and
behavior at that site. Ad serving networks collect information based
on visits to other websites and serve ads based on inferences derived
from these visits and other information. Both types of information
profiling can be controlled through limitations on the use of cookies.
Online behavioral advertising is only a small part of the current
online advertising market.' 8 ' The economic advantage of targeted ads
is that they increase the click rate. The advertiser will pay the content
provider more for a targeted ad because more people click on it. The
price of a contextual ad or a run of network online ad will be a fraction
of the targeted return rate. For content providers, this creates
additional economic support for their services.
One study estimates that targeted ads are 50% more effective in
generating sales.182 If so, that provides a way to estimate the economic
18o See Behavioral Advertising: Industry Practices and Consumers'Expectations, Joint
Hearing Before the H. Energy & Commerce Comm., Subcomm. on Commc'ns, Tech. & the
Internet, and Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot., iith Cong.
(testimony of Edward W. Felten) (2009), available at
http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/Media/file/Hearings/CTCP/o6l8o9Priva
cy/Testimony/Felten%2otestimony%2ofinal.pdf. This describes how information needed
for online behavioral advertising is collected and used.
18 FTC, Exploring Privacy: A Roundtable Series 164, (comments of Berin Szoka, Dec. 7,
2009), available at http://htc-
o1.media.globix.net/COMPoo876oMOD/ftc _web/transcripts/120709sess3.pdf
("Behavioral advertising as the industry usually talks about it, as a product, is a fairly
narrow and specific category. And it's something like $1 billion today of the $23 billion of
online advertising revenue.").
182 Steve Lohr, Privacy Concerns Limit Online Ads, Study Says, BITS, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
30, 2010), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/o4/3o/privacy-concerns-limit-online-ads-
study-says.
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damage that would result from regulation that reduced online
behavioral advertising, either through the imposition of an opt-in
notice and choice framework that was so unworkable it functioned as
a ban or through the direct imposition of a ban. Take the example of
online news sites. Currently, they generate approximately $3 billion in
revenue for the newspaper industry.183 Suppose the 50% figure is
accurate. Then if all of this revenue is currently generated from
targeted ads, then the regulatory elimination of targeted ads would
imply a loss of $1 billion. If all of the $3 billion results from generic
ads, then the elimination of online behavioral ads would block a
potential gain of $1.5 billion, which is more than twice what could be
reasonably expected from a pay wall strategy.184 Any regulatory
strategy, even one based on notice and choice, has to take into
consideration the potential impact on worthwhile online content. 8 s
Whatever the possible benefits, polls show that the public does not
like the practice of online behavioral advertising. When asked, 66% of
respondents to a recent poll said they did not like it. The more they
knew about the practice the less they liked it. When told how targeted
i8See Advertising Expenditures, Newspaper Association of America,
http://www.naa.org/TrendsandNumbers/Advertising-Expenditures.aspx. Online
advertising was $3.2 billion in 2007, $3.1 billion in 2008, and $2.7 billion in 2009.
184 If the online world reproduces the 80-20 revenue split between advertising and
subscription fee, then pay walls could generate only an extra 25% over and above the $3
billion level (or $750 million), even assuming that the pay walls did not reduce the online
audience.
185 These calculations are only illustrative, so no real conclusions about regulatory policy
can be drawn from them. The actual impact on newspapers might be substantially smaller.
One commentator at the FIC's December 7 Privacy Roundtable suggested this in his
comments on the increased effectiveness of behavioral advertising: "... if you look at
increases in click through rates and the other metrics that are used to track the
effectiveness of advertising, for the first year publisher, things like newspaper websites, the
difference may be relatively small. It might be only twice as effective, twice as revenue
producing. For small sites, it could be in many cases up to, again, a lot of data out there,
but it could be up to ten times revenue producing." FTC, Exploring Privacy: A Roundtable
Series 208, (comments of Berin Szoka, Dec. 7, 2009). A more rigorous estimate of the
impact of targeted ads has been provided by Howard Beales, former director of the Federal
Trade Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection. In a study for the Network
Advertising Initiative, he estimated that targeted ads generated almost three times the
revenue of regular run of network ads. Local display ads are still more valuable than
targeted network ads, targeted network ads are still a major component of online
advertising revenue accounting for 18% of the total. Press Release, Network Advertising
Initiative, Study Finds Behaviorally-Targeted Ads More Than Twice As Valuable, Twice As
Effective As Non-Targeted Online Ads, (Mar. 24, 2010), available at
http://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/NAIBealesRelease.pdf.
ads were developed through the use of cookies, profiles and data
analytics, the percentage of people disapproving rose to 84%.186
The current wave of public policy attention to online behavioral
advertising arose in the context of the Google DoubleClick merger. In
2007, following the FTC approval of the combination, the agency held
a workshop on behavioral advertising, followed shortly by a staff
report containing recommended principles. After a public comment
period, the FTC released a second staff report in February 2009 which
contains the latest version of its guidelines for online behavioral
advertising. 8 The issue of behavioral advertising was also a focus of
its recent roundtable discussions of privacy.188
In response to the FTC's concerns, individual companies and trade
associations have developed privacy principles and new tools to
provide information to consumers to allow them to understand and
control their experience with online behavioral advertising. Google,
for instance, developed has a tool to provide users with additional
transparency and control. Their Ad Preference Manager allows users
to see what interest categories Google has assigned them, edit their
categories or opt out entirely from receiving interest-based ads.189
,86 Joseph Turow et al., CONTRARY TO WHAT MARKETERS SAY, AMERICANS REJECT
TAILORED ADVERTISING AND THREE ACTIVITIES THAT ENABLE IT 14-16 (2009). A more
recent USA Today-Gallup poll from December 2010 reflected similar public concern about
targeted ads: "Two-thirds don't believe Internet advertisers should be able to tailor pitches
by collecting data that show where they've been prowling around in cyberspace.... Given a
choice, 47% of the respondents said they would allow only advertising networks that they
have specifically authorized to tailor ads to them. Just 14% indicated they would allow all
advertising networks to tailor such ads. But 37% said they wouldn't allow any advertising
networks to target ads their way." Edward C. Baig, Internet Users Say, Do Not Track Me,
USA Today, Dec. 13, 2010, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2010-12-14-
donottrackpolll4_STN.htm.
187 FTC, Staff Report on Self-Regulatory Principles For Online Behavioral Advertising:
Behavioral Advertising Tracking, Targeting & Technology (2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/02/behavad.shtm.
188 FTC, Exploring Privacy: A Roundtable Series,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/privacyroundtables (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
189 Letter from Pablo Chavez, to Donald S. Clark, Re: Privacy Roundtables - Comment,
Project No. P095416, 3 (Mar. 22, 1o1) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/privacyroundtable/544506-ool34.pdf. The program
has produced some data for understanding consumer preferences in this area: "While our
data is preliminary, we have noted that for every user that has opted out, about four change
their interest categories and remain opted in, and about ten do nothing." Id., at 4. The
number of Google users actually going to this site to you it, however, is "small." Exploring
Privacy: A Roundtable Series, (comments of Alan Davidson, Dec. 7, 2009), available at
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Yahoo has a similar tool called the Yahoo Ad Interest Manager.190 The
Network Advertising Initiative, an industry association of advertising
networks, has developed a set of principles for notice, choice and
dispute resolution and a way for consumers to opt out of being tracked
for the purpose of receiving targeted ads.191 The Future of Privacy
Forum has tested an icon that provides additional information about
targeted ads. The initiative is designed to give "users control and
transparency right from the advertisements themselves by featuring a
behavioral ad icon and giving "clear notice" about the origins of
targeted ads."192
These initiatives are designed to respond to the problems
associated with unread privacy policies and to engage users with easy
to use tools aimed at giving them more responsibility over their own
data collection and use. They take the informed consent model to new
levels of usability and convenience.
Despite this there are limits to what notice and consent in the area
of online behavioral advertising can be expected to achieve. As
discussed above, the basic problem is that it requires of users a level of
technical competence and interest that is simply unreasonable to
expect. For instance, many users know how to control the use of text
cookies through instructions to their browsers not to accept third-
http://htc-
o1.media.globix.net/COMPoo876oMOD1/ftcweb/transcripts/120709_seSs2.pdf.
190 See Yahoo Ad Interest Manager,
http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/opt-out/targeting/details.html (last visited Mar.
22, 2011). Like the Google tool, this software allows users to see, edit and opt out of the
interest categories to which they have been assigned based on their web browsing history.
It does not reveal the web-browsing history itself
191 For a summary of these initiatives see NAI Initiatives: A Track Record of Success,
Network Advertising Initiative (2010), http://www.networkadvertising.org/index.asp (last
visited Mar. 12, 2011). This NAI opt-out regime relies on opt out cookies that a user can
install on his computer. A technical problem arises with this regime. When users choose to
delete cookies, for example by setting their web browser controls to delete cookies as the
end of each session, this also deletes the opt-out cookies. Third-party software providers
have developed a browser plug-in that remedies this problem at the end. See, for example,
the Targeted Advertising Cookie Opt Out plug in available at
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/11o73. Targeted Advertising Cookie
Opt-Out (TACO) 3.50, Mozilla (last visited MarMar. 22, 2011). Users who want to avoid
tracking are advised to set their browser controls to reject third-party cookies or to delete
cookies at the end of each session.
192 See 201o Gallery of Leading Practices, Future of Privacy Forum,
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/2o9/11/1/1565 (last visited Mar. 22, 2011), for a full
discussion of their icon project.
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party cookies or to delete cookies at the end of every session. The new
tools will add transparency and additional granularity of control. But
not many users know about the "flash cookies" that can be placed on
their computers through the use of Adobe's Flash Player. These locally
stored objects remain on a user's computer even after regular text
cookies have been deleted and can be used for independent tracking
or for restoring deleted text cookies.193 Users can control the use of
flash cookies through settings that are available at the Flash player
website. Despite the fact that these cookies are found on
approximately 98% of computers, few are aware of these settings or
use them.194
As discussed earlier, tracking need not rely on cookies at all.
Computer configurations such as clock setting, installed fonts and
software, and other settings make each individual computer
practically unique. Companies working with website can collect these
computer settings and use them to identify computers as they visit
other websites, thereby gaining an accurate picture of the browsing
habits of the people using these computers. 195 One can imagine
technical ways to block the gathering of these digital fingerprints, but
at some point it should become clear that there is no way for ordinary
users of the Internet to win a technological "arms race" with those
whose business it is to track their online activities.
Approached through the lens of notice and choice, the debate
about privacy and online behavioral advertising will reduce to a
discussion about the default. If an opt-in is required, then almost no
193 Ryan Singel, You Deleted Your Cookies? Think Again, WIRED MAGAZINE, Aug. 10, 2009,
available at http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/o8/you-deleted-your-cookies-think-
again.
194 See Global Privacy Settings Panel, Adobe-Flash Player: Settings Manager,
http://www.macromedia.com/support/documentation/en/flashplayer/help/settings man
agerO2.html#118539 (last visited Mar. 22, 2011). In addition, browser plug-ins allow users
to monitor and delete local shared objects. See, e.g., BetterPrivacy 1.47.4 at
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/6623.
195 Julia Angwin and Jennifer Valentino-Devries, They Know: A Wall Street Journal
Investigation: Race is On to 'Fingerprint' Phones, PCs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 201o, at Al,
available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1ooo1424o5274870467920457564670 4 100 9 5 9 54 6.html
?mod=WSJTechLEADSecond. The use of these fingerprints does not rely on cookies,
which can be deleted, and is more accurate than cookies, identifying repeat visitors 89% of
the time as compared with only 78% of the time for cookies. As one online ad provider
noted about computer fingerprinting: "Our intent is that it can completely replace the use
of cookies." Id.
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one will opt in and the default will mean that online behavioral
advertising will cease. Since policymakers do not want that result, the
fall-back is an opt-out. Legislation such as the draft Boucher bill can
require websites and ad serving networks to go through the steps of
providing notice and opt out, but they cannot force users who have
lots of things to do with their time to chase down the latest
technology, learn enough about it and then determine what level of
web tracking they want. This would mean that online advertising will
be largely unregulated.
The draft Boucher bill attempts to resolve this dilemma by
imposing an additional requirement: as a condition of being able to
engage in ad serving without opt in consent, third-party advertising
networks cannot share user information with anyone else.196 But this
requirement is too strong. It is effectively a judgment that no
secondary services are worth it.
The FTC report touched on this key issue of secondary uses
beyond online behavioral advertising. It noted that "some consumer
groups cited potential harmful secondary uses, including selling
personally identifiable behavioral data, linking click stream data to P11
from other sources, or using behavioral data to make credit or
insurance decisions." But it noted that "such uses do not appear to be
well-documented" and therefore did "not propose to address this issue
in the Principles at this time." FTC staff therefore decided to "seek
more information on this issue and consider further revisions to the
Principles as needed."'97
This focus on secondary use is crucial. The profiles and
segmentations constructed by ad networks for the purpose of serving
targeted ads increase the efficiency of ad serving, but it is highly likely
that these profiles will be used for other purposes. The investment in
constructing these profiles will have a greater return when additional
revenue from such secondary purposes is forthcoming. As with any
information technology characterized by large scale economies, initial
uses of the technology can help to defray all or most of the fixed costs
of constructing the service. Additional uses of the technology can be
had for marginal costs, which in these cases might be very small. This
provides an economic incentive for offering these services at very low
costs.
196 H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (2009).
197 FrC, STAFF REPORT: SELF REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING; BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, TRACKING, TARGETING, & TECHNOLOGY 45 (2009)
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo9/02/Po854oobehavadreport.pdf.
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What might these secondary uses be? At the present time, very
little is known about them. We know that online companies continue
to collect information about browsing habits from users who have
opted out of receiving personalized ads, as this excerpt from
Microsoft's privacy opt-out page shows: "Even if you choose not to
receive personalized advertising, Microsoft will continue to collect the
same information as you browse the web and use our online services.
However, this information and any information collected from you in
the past won't be used for displaying personalized ads."98
We know that some profiles are used to target offers to website
visitors. One company is able to instantly provide profiles of visitors to
a website, which then uses that information to structure the
information and offers it presents to its visitors. Sometimes the
personalization goes to offers. Credit card companies make initial
offers based on this information, but it creates the likelihood that
websites will tailor the "look, content, prices-based on the kind of
person they think you are."99 But the extent of the secondary is not
fully available to regulatory agencies and the public.
We also know that browsing profiles are being evaluated for use in
an insurance context. The Wall Street Journal reports that a number
of companies are using online profiles to evaluate people's life
expectancy as a way to determine whether to offer life insurance and
how to price it. The profiles included their online shopping behavior
and their activities on social networking sites, and combined this
online information with extensive off-line information about life-
styles and leisure activities.200
198 Microsoft, Personalized Advertising from Microsoft,
http://choice.live.com/advertisementchoice (last updated Sept. 2009).
199 Emily Steel and Julia Angwan, On the Web's Cutting Edge, Anonymity in Name Only,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 201o, at Al, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB0001424o527487032949045753855321O919O198.html?
mod=WSJ articleRecentColumnsWhatTheyKnow. Concerns about targeting based on
protected categories such as race have been raised in this context, and a lending decision to
offer credit as opposed to a suggestion of products might implicate the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.
200 Leslie Scism and Mark Maremont, What They Know: A Wall Street Journal
Investigation: Insurers Test Data Profiles to Identify Risky Clients, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19,
2010 atAl, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424o52748704648604575620750998072986.html
?mod= WSJ articleRecentColumnsWhatTheyKnow. As explained in this article, some
companies, such as Axciom, do not rely on online browsing information that is not
individually identifiable and would not allow its data to be used by insurance companies to
assess applicants for fear of triggering the application of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
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Using the unfairness framework described earlier can help to
structure policy thinking about that issue. Where does the secondary
information use falls along the expected value continuum? For
instance, the use of the behavioral ad profiles for racial discrimination
is clearly a harmful use that should be prohibited outright. The use for
scientific research, however, might be so important that it should be
allowed regardless of the data subject's consent.
The biggest question is the use of the online behavioral profiles
and analytics for eligibility and identification decisions. The benefits
of using online profiles to aid employment, insurance and credit
granting decisions are probably substantial. People's online activities,
especially if subjected to various data mining techniques, will probably
reveal highly predictive information for these purposes. Informational
externalities are likely to be significant, both positively and negatively.
The more people whose online activities are subject to these analytical
techniques the more reliable will be the inferences that can be made
from the data. The more predictive they are the more likely they will
be to be used to evaluate people for eligibility decisions.
Do policymakers want to permit this? Consumer and privacy
groups have raised this question with the FTC, noting that behavioral
profiles derived from online activities are useable for purposes beyond
targeted advertising. In connection with an FTC complaint regarding
the online collection of health information, Ed Mierzwinski of
USPIRG noted that employers or health insurers could gain access to
the consumers' data profiles, leading to potential problems or
penalties against the consumer. 2 0 1
The basic reason for thinking clearly about the policy option of not
permitting the use of online profiles for eligibility decisions is the
possibility that people will reduce their use of the Internet
dramatically in order to avoid generating information that can be used
against them in employment, insurance and credit-granting contexts.
This chilling effect might be so substantial that it would block much of
the vibrancy and innovation that has characterized the Internet so far.
Looked at a different way, deciding that people can do whatever they
20 Natasha Singer, Privacy Groups Fault Online Health Sites for Sharing User Data with
Marketers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 201o, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/business/24drug.html. Mierzwinski added: "You
could be searching for health information about your cat or your neighbor and it could end
up harming your health care in terms of denial or increased cost." Id.
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want on the Internet without fear that it will be recorded in a database
that can be used against them in these key contexts (and publicizing
this fact!) will remove some of the reluctance that many currently have
in engaging fully in online activity.
On the other hand, the advantages of using these profiles for these
eligibility purposes might overwhelm the disadvantages of
discouraging online activity. The use of these profiles and analytics for
these eligibility purposes will likely subject the firms gathering and
analyzing the data to the provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
Policymakers who want to allow these additional uses might want to
clarify the regulatory regime that would apply.
B. SOCIAL NETWORKS
Privacy policy changes at major social networks like Facebook
have generated substantial complaints, and calls for regulatory action.
The most recent concerns stem from Facebook's introduction of new
features:
The first feature, instant personalization, allows certain
partner sites to use data from a Facebook user's profile
to customize their online experience. For example, if a
Facebook user visits Pandora, an Internet radio
website, instant personalization will allow Pandora to
create a custom radio station for the user based on
their likes and dislikes from their Facebook profile. The
second new feature, social plugins, allows developers to
place a Facebook widget on their website so that
visitors can "Like" a page or post comments. These
interests can then be shown on a Facebook user's news
feed and users can see their friend's activity. Both of
these new features users can opt not to use. 2 0 2
202 Daniel Castro, Info. Tech. & Innovation Found, The Right to Privacy Is Not a Right to
Facebook, (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.itif.org/publications/facebook-not-right. These
developments have created substantial excitement in the technology community and have
fueled talk of Facebook overtaking Google. See Farhad Manjoo, Facebook's Plan To Take
Over the Web: WillAll Those "Like" Buttons Make Facebook Bigger than Google?, SLATE,
Apr. 22, 2010, http://www.slate.com/id/2251646/; Chris O'Brien, Sorry, Google, but
Facebook Is the Web's Most Important Company Now, MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 29, 2010,
available at hti http://www.eagletribune.com/business/x116447o255/Sory-Google-but-
Facebook-is-the-Webs-most-important-company-now/print.
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Concerned Senators wrote to the Federal Trade Commission
asking the agency to impose new regulations. Consumer and privacy
groups filed an additional complaint with the FTC, citing the
inadequacies of the Facebook disclosures and consent mechanisms.
The key policy proposals recommended by concerned Senators,
however, are essentially better notice and choice. And the key debate
is whether consumers should be allowed only an opt-out choice or
whether the company should first get consumer consent before
sharing any information. Senators and consumer groups want the FTC
to mandate opt in; Facebook already provides opt out.20 3
This misses the main source of concern. The main issue is not
control. Facebook users do need an effective opt-out in some
circumstances and perhaps Facebook should be required to get
affirmative express consent before getting personal information for
certain uses. In the unfairness framework the kind of disclosure,
notice and choice provided should depend on an assessment of what is
being done with the information. The real issue is further use of the
profiles that Facebook is compiling on its members and the use that
can be made of the inferences that can be drawn from these profiles.
Several examples of these uses are worth looking at. The first is the
study conducted by students in Boston that found it possible to
predict the sexual orientation of a Facebook member by examining the
sexual orientation of his friends. A person might not have revealed his
sexual orientation in his Facebook profile, but his friends had revealed
theirs. An analysis of friendship patterns on social networks revealed a
high probability that people share their friends' sexual orientation.2o4
As commentators have noted this strikes at the heart of the view that
sees privacy as control over information.205 It also illustrates in a
203 For these developments, see Letter from Charles Schumer et al., Senators, to Marc
Zuckerberg (Apr. 27, 2010), available at
http://schumer.senate.gov/new-website/record.cfm?id= 324226 (asserting that personal
information of Facebook users "should remain private unless a user decides that he/she
would like to make a connection and share this information with a community.");
Complaint of EPIC et al., In the Matter of Facebook, (F.T.C. 201o), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/EPICFTCFB-Complaint.pdf For a description of the
Facebook privacy controls in mid-2010 see Riva Richmond, A Guide to Facebook's New
Privacy Settings, N.Y. TIMES, GADGETWISE May 27, 2010,
http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2olo/o5/27/5-steps-to-reset-your-facebook-
privacy-settings.
204 See Moore, supra note 15.
205 See Project 'Ga ydar', BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 2009, IN GLOBE ONLINE available at
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2o09/o9/2o/project~gaydar an mit
experiment raises new quesfions about onlineprivacy/?page-1. Quoting Hal
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striking way the power of information externalities where one person's
decision to reveal information can simultaneously and unintentionally
reveal information about others. The question for policy is what can
be done with this information. It is one thing for researchers to
conduct such a study. It is another for the information to be published
on the Internet or in a newspaper, or to be sold to the highest bidder
for whatever purpose the buyer wants to use it for. A crucial privacy
question for social networks is how to deal with the further use of this
information.
It is tempting to think that the solution is further attempts at
concealment. One way to do this might be to have a default of secrecy
of friends. Under this approach, no one should know anyone else's
friends, unless people explicitly reveal them. This applies to all
members of the Facebook network and to application providers as
well. But this throws out the baby with the bathwater. The networking
advantages of platforms such as Facebook largely derive from
openness and sharing of information about relationships. Imposing a
default of no sharing is likely to limit innovation, growth and
development of this promising new technology. Unless policymakers
want to approach this issue with the blunt instrument of a mandated
no sharing default, they will be forced to look carefully at problematic
uses and decide what to do about them.
Many employers use information from social networks and other
online sources to evaluate potential employees. According to a
Microsoft survey, over 75% percent of U.S. companies review online
records as part of the recruitment process and 70% percent say they
have rejected applicants based on these reviews. 206 Other companies
monitor the use of social network sites by their employees.2Q7
Abelson: "That pulls the rug out from a whole policy and technology perspective that the
point is to give you control over your information - because you don't have control over
your information." Id.
206 Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End ofForgetting, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 21,
2010, at 32, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-
t2.html.
207 Joshua Brustein, Keeping a Closer Eye on Employees'Social Networking, N.Y. TIMES,
BITs, Mar. 26, 201o, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/o3/26/keeping-a-closer-eye-on-
workers-social-networking/?scp= 1&sq=facebook%2oemployers&st=cse. The ability of
companies to fire workers for Facebook activity is limited by labor law requirements
allowing employees substantial discretion to discuss working conditions. See Steven
Greenhouse, Company Accused of Firing Over Facebook Post, New York Times, Nov. 8,
2010, available at
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A further secondary use of Facebook information that raises
problems is the ability of third parties to use Facebook information to
create files and scores that are useful for eligibility decisions. The
process is straightforward:
Social graphs allow credit issuers to know if you're
connected to a community of great credit customers.
Creditors can see if people in your network have
accounts with them, and are free to look at how they
are handling those accounts. The presumption is that if
those in your network are responsible cardholders,
there is a better chance you will be, too. So, if a bank is
on the fence about whether to extend you credit, you
may become eligible if those in your network are good
credit customers.208
The basic technique used here is social media monitoring. It was
originally designed to help companies and high profile individuals to
monitor their reputation online. Companies, for example, would be
given the chance to see what people were saying about them online.
The same techniques can be used to develop predictive models about
the individuals who are discussing the companies online.
The result is that data mining of online activities and activities,
profiles and friend lists on social network sites can not only help
predict what ads people might pay attention to. They can help predict
"whether or not you're a worthwhile risk for a credit card or a
loan..."209 Some firms in the area suggest that they are simply helping
banks and other institutions "target" customers.210  But other
institutions indicated that they were indeed using the social
http://www.nytimes.com/201o/11/og/business/ogfacebook.html?_r=i&partner=rss&emc
=rss.
208 Erica Sandberg, Social Networking: Your Key to Easy Credit?, Creditcards.com, Jan.
13, 2010, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/social-networking-social-graphs-
credit-1282.php.
209 Lucas Conley, How Rapleaf is Data Mining Your Friend Lists to Predict Your Credit
Risk, FASTCOMPANY.COM, Nov. 16, 2009, http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/lucas-
conley/advertising-branding-andmarketing/company-we-keep.
21o See Aleksandra Todorova, Could Your Tweets Affect Your Credit?, SMARTMONEY.COM,
Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.smartmoney.com/Personal-Finance/Debt/Could-Your-
Tweets-Really-Affect-Your-Credit/?page= all.
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networking information to make decisions on what offers to make and
to evaluate the creditworthiness of applicants.21,
As in the online behavioral advertising case, the issue is
complicated by the presence of information externalities. One user
might not reveal much about his finances during his online visits and
interactions. But his interactions reveal who his contacts and friends
are. His social network can be charted and mapped. Other people in
that network might have revealed their financial information, either
online or directly to a financial institution with which they have a
relationship. One way or another, information about the original data
subject leaks, despite his best efforts to keep the information secret. If
the information turns out to improve his chances of credit or
employment, this might be to his advantage. If not, he has suffered
external information harm.
The informed consent model does not help policymakers with the
puzzles posed by these examples of secondary use. Short of reducing
dramatically the effectiveness and innovative potential of social
networks, blanket sharing restrictions will not work. The key question
is whether it is worth it to allow the information practice of using
social network information for eligibility decisions, and if so under
what conditions. The use of social network information to make
employment decisions has attracted strong criticism and suggestions
for restrictions on the use of Facebook information in employment
contexts.21 2 A proposed German law, for example, would prevent the
use of Facebook information for employment decisions. 213 While this
particular law might prove hard to enforce, it illustrates several
features of the unfairness framework that are worth highlighting.
211 Ginny Mies, Skeptical Shopper: Can Your Online Life Ruin Your Credit, PC WORLD,
Mar. 23, 20o, available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/192207. Further problems of
this sort arise when application developers on social networks obtain information which
they then turn over to data brokers. See Geoffrey A. Fowler & Emily Steel, Facebook in
Privacy Breach, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 201o, at Al; Geoffrey A. Fowler & Emily Steel,
Facebook Says User Data Sold To Broker, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2010.
212 See Rosen, supra note 207, (quoting Paul Ohm, University of Colorado professor of law,
"[M]ake it illegal for employers to fire or refuse to hire anyone on the basis of legal off-duty
conduct revealed in Facebook postings or Google profiles." Ohm proposes that "Facebook
status updates have taken the place of water-cooler chat, which employers were never
supposed to overhear, and we could pass a prohibition on the sorts of information
employers can and can't consider when they hire someone.").
213 David Jolly, Germany Plans Limits On Facebook Use In Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25,
2010, at B8, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2olo/o8/26/business/global/26fbiookhtml.
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First, the restriction applies not to the collection of information by
Facebook, but to the use of it by employers. The control appears at the
level of use - not at the level of information collection. Second,
individual consent is irrelevant. The proposed law does not provide
for even the fullest, most robust most fully informed consent. As we
have noted above, it recognizes that in the employment context
informed consent quickly unravels - prospective employees would
assume that employers would reject anyone who refuses to allow
access to his or her Facebook account and that granting access is
simply a condition of continuing in the applicant pool. Third, the law
embodies the kind of cost-benefit thinking that is needed: do the
advantages of using Facebook in an employment context outweigh the
damage to the integrity and openness of the social network context?
In the case of using social network information for other eligibility
decisions such as granting credit, the balance, as in the online
behavioral advertising case, seems to be between restricting the use of
social networking information in order to preserve the sense of
uninhibited and wide-open interchange, or permitting them under an
appropriate regulatory framework. The likelihood is that FCRA would
apply to these cases, but if policymakers want to permit these uses it
would be useful to clarify the applicable regulatory regime.214
V. CONCLUSION
In contrast to the informed consent model of privacy policy, the
unfairness model sketched in this paper calls for substantive
evaluation of the uses of information when making privacy policy. The
basis for this idea that substantive privacy policy is needed is that
consumers cannot be expected to master the ways in which
information can be collected and used. In particular, they cannot be
expected to follow the myriad ways in which information leaks, the
way information about some people can be used to make inferences
about others.
Despite a growing awareness of the power of data analytics to
enable powerful inferences, many sophisticated Internet users
maintain that individual control can still be effective. As one
214 The Center for Democracy and Technology has asked the Federal Trade Commission to
bring companies that provide online information to companies for making eligibility
decisions under the scope of the FCRA. See Press Release from CDT, Center for Democracy
and Technology Files FTC Complaint Against Spokeo, Inc. (June 30, 2010), available at
http://www.cdt.org/pr statement/center-democracy-and-technology-files-ftc-complaint-
against-spokeo-inc.
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commentator on a recent New York Times article on online behavioral
advertising said:
I just don't get why most Americans put up with this. It
really is creepy. And it's actually fairly easy to opt out.
Using Firefox with Adblock Plus, NoScript and a few
other plugins, I don't see ads. I clear cookies (including
Flash cookies) at exit. I use secure VPNs to anonymize
my IP address, and disable geolocation. You could
too. 215
Part of the point of this article is that most people will not do any
of those things. And they probably cannot be educated into doing
them either. It is simply not reasonable to expect them to keep up with
the latest technological ways of gathering information about them and
making inferences from the data collected. It is unreasonable to expect
ordinary consumers to become experts at hiding information from
people who spend most of their working day trying to get at it.
The lesson of information externalities, moreover, is that even if
they could be persuaded to do all these things, they will still be subject
to indirect information leakages. As data aggregation continues, as
linkages among different data sets more extensive and as data mining
analytics become more effective, predictive inferences about people
will become more accurate. People will be less able to protect the
secrecy of their information through concealment. Indirect inferences
based on data analytics will reveal these facts with an acceptable level
of certainty that people do not wish to reveal.
As one consumer group put it, "Even the most information
conscious, privacy-sensitive consumer cannot escape being profiled
through careful information habits."216
These profiles and analytic inferences can be used for a variety of
secondary purposes, including making employment, insurance and
215 Readers Comments from Hierophant UK, Privacy Concerns Limit Online Ads, Study
Says, N.Y. TIMES, BITS, May 3, 2010,
http://community.nytimes.com/comments/bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/O4/30/privacy-
concerns-limit-online-ads-study-says/?permid= 8#comment8.
216 Letter from World Privacy Forum, to FTC, re: Privacy Roundtables - Comment, Project
No. P095416, 2 (Nov. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/WPFComments-FTCl1o6o9fs.pdf
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credit granting decisions about people. The fundamental privacy
question policymakers are facing is whether that is a desirable future.
That is one reason why privacy policy is so hard. It is possible to
approach this fundamental question indirectly through a question of
how to structure choice about data collection - should it be opt-in or
opt-out? But policymakers really do not know whether to provide a
default of data collection and use or its opposite unless they make an
evaluation of the use. It is this use-based privacy model that needs to
be developed and moved forward into the public policy arena.
